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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON CREDIT CONSTRAINTS AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Christine M. Harrington
The first essay, “Debt Capacity Constraints, Information, and the Pecking Order
Model of Capital Structure”, investigates why the pecking order model does not appear to
describe the financing choices of small and growth firms. The pecking order model
predicts debt issues only when a firm has the capacity to absorb new debt and when firm
value is relatively predictable. By explicitly controlling for asymmetric information
about firm risk, empirical tests support the predictions of the pecking order model for
small and growth firms.
The second essay, “The Sensitivity of Investment to Internal Funds When the
Costs of External Funds Differ”, asks whether the observed investment-cash flow
sensitivity of financially constrained firms can be explained by relatively high security
issue costs. Security issue costs are indicative of credit constraints. The empirical tests
suggest that only cash is relatively more important to investment spending for high issue
cost firms, but not because of the need for cash to fund planned investment. Cash serves
as an indicator of growth opportunities not captured by empirical approximations of
Tobin’s Q. Further tests demonstrate that commonly used methods to identify financially
constrained firms mimic relatively high security issue costs.
The third essay, “The Effect of Competitive Structure on the Relationship
between Leverage and Profitability”, attempts to explain why firms in concentrated
industries have different responses of leverage ratios to current profitability. The
leverage-profitability relationship is important to distinguishing between the pecking
order and trade-off theories of capital structure. The essay examines whether the speed
of reversion in profitability affects the leverage-profitability relationship. When U.S.
Census data are used to measure industry concentration, the empirical results support the
prediction that differences in the leverage-profitability relationship between competitive
and concentrated industries is related to differences in the speed of reversion in
profitability.
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Chapter 1
Debt Capacity Constraints, Information, and the
Pecking Order Model of Capital Structure

Abstract
Prior empirical results suggest that the pecking order model better explains the financing behavior
of large public firms compared to small and growth firms. This paper finds that the lack of
support for the pecking order model in samples of small and growth firms is driven in part by
differences in asymmetric information about firm risk. The results from explicitly controlling for
debt capacity constraints and the influence of asymmetric information about firm risk suggest that
risk is highly relevant to small, growth firms. Small and high growth firms with relatively low
asymmetric information about firm risk and that are not concerned with debt capacity constraints
issue an equivalent proportion of debt as large, mature firms when filling the financing deficit.
The results of this study indicate that high-risk small-high growth firms fund investment
primarily with equity, an observation that is consistent with the pecking order model of Myers
and Majluf (1984).

1

1.1 Introduction
The general applicability of the pecking order model of Myers (1984) and Myers
and Majluf (1984) has been challenged by the observation that small and growth firms
primarily issue equity, counter to the model’s standard prediction of debt issues when
external financing is needed (Helwege and Liang, 1996; Fama and French, 2002; Frank
and Goyal, 2003) 1 . Recent studies suggest that the standard result of the pecking order
model is conditional on firm characteristics. Specifically, debt financing arises as a
special case when firms have sufficient debt capacity (Lemmon and Zender, 2002; Agca
and Mozumdar, 2003), are mature in their life cycle (Bulan and Yan, 2006), or are least
susceptible to problems with risk assessment (Halov and Heider, 2005). Rather than
dooming the pecking order model to failure based on the observation that young firms are
predominantly equity issuers, the model does predict equity issues conditional on the
inability to assess firm risk.
The pecking order model in Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) is based
on asymmetric information between market participants and firm managers, wherein
market participants discount the value of securities as compensation for the possibility of
purchasing a “lemon” (Akerlof, 1970). The standard financing hierarchy predicted by the
pecking order model (firms will first use internal funds, then riskless debt, risky debt, and
equity as a last resort) results from progressively relaxing assumptions of the model. For
financing investment, internal funds are preferred to external resources given that the
firm has sufficient retained earnings. Relaxing this assumption, the firm with sufficient
debt capacity and a relatively predictable payoff from the use of assets will issue debt. In
1

Carpenter and Petersen (2002) find that high-tech firms that obtain external financing do so mainly with
secured debt.
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this case, asymmetric information between investors and managers is about the payoff of
the investment (assuming that investors know the distribution of possible payoffs, if not
the payoff itself). Without debt capacity, the firm issues equity 2 . However, with debt
capacity, but without a relatively predictable outcome from the use of assets, or when
there is greater asymmetric information about the variance of possible payoffs, the model
predicts equity issues to finance investment. As stated in Myers and Majluf, this is the
case where asymmetric information about firm risk dominates that of firm value. The
security issue predictions of the pecking order model are summarized below and clearly
indicate that debt issues are a special case of the model when asymmetric information
about risk and debt capacity constraints are not overriding concerns:

Asymmetric information about
value dominates asymmetric
information about risk
Asymmetric information about
risk dominates asymmetric
information about value

No debt capacity
constraint

Debt capacity
constraint

Debt

Equity

Equity

Equity

This study tests whether asymmetric information about risk is relevant to the debtequity choice as predicted in Myers and Majluf (1984). The central hypothesis for
empirical tests is that firms engaging in inherently more risky projects are those for which
investors are likely to have the greatest difficulty assessing firm risk. Firms with

2

Myers (1984) argues that firms requiring high levels of external financing are debt capacity constrained,
regardless of existing leverage.
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relatively greater asymmetric information about firm risk are expected to issue equity in
the context of the pecking order model even when debt capacity is not a concern. This
result is expected to emerge particularly for small and growth firms, subsamples that may
be most susceptible to problems with assessing both firm risk and value.
Firms that engage in inherently risky projects are identified as those with
relatively high research and development expenditures. R&D intensity has previously
been used as an explanatory variable for debt issues (e.g., Bhagat and Welch, 1995;
Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim, 1984) for much the same reason that it is used herein—to
identify firms with inherently risky projects. However, previous studies do not formally
explain why R&D intensity should matter to debt issuance, whereas Myers and Majluf
provide a foundation for the use of R&D intensity to approximate asymmetric
information about firm risk.
The research question is similar to that in Halov and Heider (2005), who use
market-based measures to approximate perceptions of firm risk. The investigation also
extends the work of Lemmon and Zender (2002) and Agca and Mozumdar (2003) by
considering the role of debt capacity constraints in the external financing decision jointly
with the nature of asymmetric information, relating these firm characteristics to security
issues predicted in Myers and Majluf (1984).
As a benchmark case, the main empirical test in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)
is replicated for samples defined by size and growth. The regression results are similar to
those in Frank and Goyal (2003) in all subsamples except for low-growth, small firms.
This subsample of firms primarily issues debt to fill the financing deficit. The results
from explicitly controlling for debt capacity constraints show that small, high growth

4

firms without debt capacity constraints issue significantly more debt than small, high
growth firms with debt capacity constraints, supporting the conclusions in Lemmon and
Zender (2002). Asymmetric information about firm risk is highly relevant to small,
growth firms. Small, high growth firms with relatively low asymmetric information
about firm risk and without debt capacity constraints issue an equivalent proportion of
debt as large, mature firms when filling the financing deficit. This result is counter to the
conclusion of Frank and Goyal (2003) about small and growth firms. The results of this
study indicate that high-risk small-high growth firms fund investment primarily with
equity, an observation that is consistent with the pecking order model of Myers and
Majluf (1984).
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 describes prior empirical tests of the
pecking order model. Section 3 sets up the empirical method used to test the predictions
of the pecking order model. The data and sample selection are described in Section 4.
The results from testing the propositions of the pecking order model are presented and
discussed in Section 5, and the robustness of the results is examined in Section 6. Section
7 concludes.

1.2 Prior tests of the pecking order model
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) test the prediction that firms prefer to issue debt
to fill a financing using the following regression function:

ΔDEBTjt = b0 + b1DEFjt + ejt

(1)
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ΔDEBTjt is the net debt issue of firm j in period t and DEFjt is the financing deficit, or the
difference between cash flows and investment of firm j in period t. The pecking order
model predicts that b0=0 and b1=1. Shyam-Sunder and Myers conduct their empirical
tests with a sample of 157 firms with a 19-year continuous history in Compustat.
Because only large and mature firms are considered, the sampling procedure incorporates
the assumptions that firms have sufficient debt capacity. The survival requirement is also
likely to control for the predictability of the distribution of firm value. Shyam-Sunder
and Myers find that the estimated intercept is statistically equal to zero, and that the
coefficient estimate for DEF is around 0.7, and based on this and additional tests,
conclude that the pecking order is a good first-order approximation of the financing
choices of their sample firms.
Chirinko and Singha (2000) question the ability of the tests in Shyam-Sunder and
Myers (1999) to provide support for the pecking order prediction that firms follow a
financing hierarchy. Chirinko and Singha propose that while the Shyam-Sunder/Myers
test fails to generate an R2 of 100%, the empirical results are consistent with a weakerform hypothesis that firms will first exhaust internal funds, and then issue debt up to debt
capacity, and as a last resort, issue equity to generate the remaining cash needed for
investment. However, the results are also consistent with the static trade-off prediction
that firms issue a mix of debt and equity to maintain optimal capital structure (Chirinko
and Singha, 2000).
Frank and Goyal (2003) reexamine the results in Shyam-Sunder and Myers
(1999) for a broader sample that includes small and high growth firm. Sorting firms by
asset size and the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for growth prospects, Frank and Goyal
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estimate eq. (1) and find general support for the Shyam-Sunder and Myers results for the
large and low growth samples. However, Frank and Goyal argue that the pecking order
model does not adequately describe the financing choices of small and growth firms,
which are observed to be net equity issuers.
Lemmon and Zender (2002) and Agca and Mozumdar (2003) suggest that the
small and growth firm results in Frank and Goyal (2003) are linked to concerns over debt
capacity constraints. Lemmon and Zender show that younger, high growth firms tend to
have the highest debt capacity constraints, and firms with these characteristics tend to
issue equity to fill the financing deficit, as predicted in Myers (1984) and Myers and
Majluf (1984). Agca and Mozumdar also control for debt capacity constraints, and
generate results similar to those in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) for firms that are
relatively unconstrained by debt capacity.
Similar to Lemmon and Zender (2002) and Agca and Mozumdar (2003), this
study also attempts to explain the lack of support for the pecking order model in small
and growth firm samples found in Frank and Goyal (2003) by considering the role of debt
capacity constraints in the debt-equity choice. Unlike prior studies, this study also
considers the role of the nature of asymmetric information in the debt-equity choice. If
small, growth firms are inherently more susceptible to asymmetric information about firm
risk due to a relatively limited public track record, then even if debt capacity constraints
are not a concern, these firms may issue equity as predicted by the pecking order model.
On the other hand, if small, growth firms undertake projects with reasonably predictable
outcomes, then asymmetric information about the value of the investment may override
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asymmetric information about risk. In this case, small, growth firms are predicted to
issue debt when debt capacity is not reached.

1.3 Empirical method
The investigation of whether asymmetric information about firm risk influences
the debt-equity choice of small, growth firms is conducted in several steps to net out the
firm years for which asymmetric information about firm risk may dominate asymmetric
information about firm value. As in Frank and Goyal (2003), firm years are first
classified by size and growth and the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) regression is
replicated for four cohorts of firm years, small-low growth, small-high growth, large-low
growth, and large-high growth. This replication provides a benchmark set of results for
the influence of a financing deficit on debt issues. Controls for debt capacity constraints
are introduced into the Shyam-Sunder and Myers test to produce a second set of
benchmark results. The pecking order model predicts debt issues when two conditions
are satisfied: sufficient debt capacity and symmetric information about the distribution of
future firm value. Equity issues are predicted in all other cases. Therefore, firm years in
which debt capacity constraints are not a concern are the candidate firm years for testing
whether asymmetric information about the variance of firm risk is important to the
security issue choice of firms with financing deficits.

1.3.1 Classifying firms by size and growth
Firms are classified by size based on the distribution of real beginning-period total
assets. Similar to Frank and Goyal (2003), firm years in the third of the distribution

8

containing the lowest values of the total assets distribution are labeled as “small”, and
“large” firm years are defined as those observations in the third with the highest values of
total assets. Using an independent sort, firm years are classified by growth based on the
distribution of the beginning-period market-to-book assets ratio. Firm years in the third
of the distribution containing the highest market-to-book values of assets are labeled as
“high growth”, and firm years in the lowest third of the market-to-book distribution are
referred to as “low growth”. To control for overlap between size and growth, a “four
corner cut” is used to classify firms as small-low growth, small-high growth, large-low
growth, and large-high growth. For example, the small-high growth subsample contains
firm years that are classified as both small and high growth. Because the extremes of the
distributions of size and growth measures are central to explaining the lack of support for
the pecking order model in Frank and Goyal, firm years that do not fall into one of the
four above categories are omitted from the analysis.

1.3.2 Definition of the financing deficit
The financing deficit is defined as in Frank and Goyal (2003) as the sum of
ordinary dividends, change in working capital, and investment spending less internal cash
flows, or

DEFt = DIVt + ΔWCAPt + INVESTt – CASHFLOWt = ΔDEBTt + ΔEQt

(2)

The variables that define DEF are constructed as follows:
DIVt

Ordinary cash dividends in year t

ΔWCAPt

Change in working capital in year t, ΔWCAPt = change in operating working

9

capital + change in cash and equivalents + change in current debt
INVESTt

Net investment in year t, INVESTt = capital expenditures + increase in investments
+ acquisitions + other use of funds – sale of PPE – sale of investments

CASHFLOWt

Cash flow after interest and taxes, CASHFLOWt = income before extraordinary
items + depreciation and amortization + extraordinary items and discontinued
operations + deferred taxes + equity in net loss + other funds from operations +
gain (loss) from sales of PPE and other investments

ΔDEBTt

Net debt issued in year t, ΔDEBTt = long-term debt issuance – long-term debt
reductions

ΔEQt

Net equity issued in year t, ΔEQt = sale of common and preferred stock – stock
repurchases

Period t refers to the end of the fiscal period.

1.3.3 Shyam-Sunder and Myers regression
Frank and Goyal (2003) use the regression function in Shyam-Sunder and Myers
(1999) to test the ability of the financing deficit to explain net debt issues for small and
growth firms. Although additional research demonstrates the importance of controlling
for debt capacity constraints, the Shyam-Sunder and Myers regression serves as a
benchmark for comparing the results that consider the influence of debt capacity
constraints and the nature of the asymmetric information. According to the pecking order
model, if asymmetric information about firm value dominates asymmetric information
about firm risk and if debt capacity constraints are not a concern, then absent sufficient
internal funds, firms choose to finance investment with debt issues, or,
DEFt = ΔDEBTt
Shyam-Sunder and Myers empirically investigate this proposition with the
following regression function:
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ΔDEBTjt = b0 + b1DEFjt + ejt

(1)

As discussed earlier, Chirinko and Singha (2000) note that eq. (1) is a strong-form
hypothesis with an expected R2 of 100%. Chirinko and Singha also suggest that at some
level of debt issues, debt capacity constraints may be binding, and firms primarily filling
the financing deficit with debt may also issue equity to generate the remaining cash
needed for investment. The implication is that a weak-form hypothesis is more likely to
be observed.

1.3.4 Debt capacity considerations
As in Lemmon and Zender (2002), debt capacity constraints are approximated by
a firm’s expected future financing deficit over a 5-year period and its initial leverage
relative to the industry median at the beginning of the 5-year period. To create the
expected future financing deficit, firm years are grouped into 5-year non-overlapping
intervals, and then the financing deficit is averaged within each 5-year period. A firm
must have at least 3 observations of the financing deficit to be included in an interval.
For each 5-year interval, firms are sorted into three groups based on the average
financing deficit: low, moderate, and high future external financing needs. A firm’s
leverage position in the first year it enters an interval is measured relative to the industry
median at the beginning of the interval. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term
debt to total assets. The industry median debt-to-assets ratio is located by 2-digit SIC
code. Firms are independently sorted into two groups based on the leverage position
observed at the beginning of each interval: low and high initial leverage (relative to the
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industry median). Firms with high future financing needs are considered as constrained
by debt capacity regardless of the initial leverage position (DCC). Firms with moderate
expected future financing needs and low initial leverage are classified as not concerned
over debt capacity constraints (NDCC).
Absent any asymmetric information about firm risk, the pecking order model
predicts that NDCC firms issue debt to fill the financing deficit. To test this prediction
controlling for debt capacity constraints, the financing deficit (DEF) and the regression
intercept are interacted with indicators for NDCC firm years (the indicator equals one if a
firm year is classified as NDCC, 0 otherwise). The following regression function is used
to test the explanatory power of the financing deficit under conditions of debt capacity
constraints and otherwise:

ΔDEBTjt = aNDCC + aDCC + b1DEFjtNDCC + b2DEFjtDCC + ejt

(3)

In the above equation, aNDCC corresponds to the intercept term for the NDCC firm years,
and aDCC to the intercept term for firm years concerned over debt capacity constraints
(DCC).

DEFNDCC represents the financing deficit interacted with the indicator for

NDCC firm years, and DEFDCC is the financing deficit interacted with the indicator for
DCC firm years. Absent any asymmetric information about firm risk and concerns over
debt capacity constraints, the pecking order theory predicts that aNDCC=0 and b1=1
(strong-form hypothesis). For firm years in which debt capacity is a concern, the pecking
order model predicts that aDCC=0 and b2<1. If the weak-form hypothesis holds, then the
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coefficient estimate for b1 is expected to be statistically and economically larger than that
for b2.

1.3.5 Asymmetric information about firm risk
Prior studies suggest that firms that are relatively intensive in research and
development activities tend to use less debt in their capital structure (for example, Bhagat
and Welch, 1995). Myers and Majluf (1984) and Hall (2002) offer possible explanations
for this observation. First is the risk of competition that may result from fully disclosing
the details of an innovation project. Second, firms that are relatively intensive in R&D
face the joint risk of turnover in employees associated with the project and an uncertain
payoff of the project itself. Hall suggests that the need to retain employees involved in a
project with an uncertain payoff may cause the firm to act as if it faces high adjustment
costs to the prospect of human capital loss. Hall explains that a large fraction of R&D
expense is in salaries and wages, and the innovation project does not generate the
required cash flow. Given the disclosure and payoff risks, firms that are relatively R&D
intensive may have a more severe form of information asymmetry about firm risk that
may dominate asymmetric information about firm value, resulting in less debt offerings
compared to firms with less (or zero) R&D intensity. Information asymmetry about firm
risk arising from the relatively risky use of assets in pursuit of product development is
expected to be compounded by a relatively limited existence as a public firm and/or
aggressive growth strategies.
As a proxy for asymmetric information about firm risk, the influence of R&D
intensity on the decision to issue debt is first tested as an independent factor for NDCC
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and DCC firm years. Eq. (3) is modified to include R&D expense interacted with
indicators for the NDCC and DCC firm years as follows:

ΔDEBTjt = aNDCC + aDCC + b1DEFjtNDCC + b2DEFjtDCC +
b3RDjtNDCC + b4RDjtDCC + ejt

(4)

RDNDCC (RDDCC) represents R&D intensity for NDCC (DCC) firm years, defined as the
level of reported R&D expense divided by total assets. As in eq. (3), aNDCC and aDCC are
predicted to be zero, b1=1 (strong-form hypothesis), b2 < 1, and b1 > b2 (weak-form
hypothesis). The coefficient estimates for RD are expected to be negative and
significant, indicating that higher information asymmetry about firm risk reduces the
amount of debt issued.
As an additional test of the effect of risk on the debt issue decision, debt capacity
constraints are controlled by examining the response of debt issues to the financing
deficit for NDCC firm years only. R&D expense again proxies for the degree of
asymmetric information about firm risk. NDCC firm years are sorted into thirds of the
distribution of R&D expense, and upper (lower) third of the firm years are identified as
those with relatively high (low) information asymmetries about firm risk. Similar to the
method for defining eq. (3), indicators of the degree of firm risk for the relatively low
(high) risk firm years are used to form DEFLORISK and DEFHIRISK, representing the
financing deficit of the firm years in which the degree of firm risk is relatively low and
high, respectively. The intercept terms, aLORISK and aHIRISK, correspond to the low- and
high-risk firm years, respectively. The regression function used to test the prediction that
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NDCC firms will issue equity when information asymmetry about firm risk is relatively
high is the following:

ΔDEBTjt = aLORISK + aHIRISK + b1DEFjtLORISK + b2DEFjtHIRISK + ejt

(5)

As above, the intercept estimates are expected to be statistically equal to zero. The
estimate for b1 is expected to be close to 1, and the estimate for b2 is expected to be
significantly lower than that for b1.

1.4 Data and sample description
The data are from Compustat annual active and research files from 1982-2001.
The sample construction method generally follows Frank and Goyal (2003). Only
publicly traded (Compustat stock ownership codes 0 and 3), U.S.-incorporated firms are
included in the sample. Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC
4900-4999) are excluded, as are firms with major mergers (Compustat footnote code
AB). Included firm years must have the following data items: Statement of Cash Flows
format code (Compustat item 318), long-term debt issuance (item 111), positive net sales
(item 12), income before extraordinary items and taxes (item 123), change in cash and
equivalents (item 274), book values of assets (item 6) at the end of the previous fiscal
year, long-term debt (item 9) at the end of the fiscal year, positive common equity (item
60), common shares outstanding at fiscal year end (item 25), a closing stock price at
fiscal year end (item 199), and reported net plant, property, and equipment (item 8) for
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two consecutive years. R&D intensity is measured as the reported R&D expense over the
period (Compustat item 46) divided by beginning-period assets (R&D) 3 .
Many balance sheet and cash flow statement observations are set to zero4 if
recorded as missing or combined with other data items, where appropriate. Control for
the influence of IPOs follows Carpenter and Petersen (2002) 5 . Observations prior to and
including the first year in which a nonmissing stock price appears in Compustat are
deleted. All financial variables are scaled by the book value of beginning-period total
assets (where appropriate). When unscaled financial variables are reported as descriptive
measures, these are expressed in real terms 6 .
The data are screened for irregularities. Firm years with long-term debt either
reported as zero or greater than concurrent total assets are deleted. Firm years with
negative values of the current portion of long-term debt are deleted. Negative values of
cash dividends are reported for some firm years, and these are deleted as well.

1.5 Results
Descriptive statistics for the high growth/large, high growth/small, low
growth/large, and low growth/small subsamples of firm years are presented in Table 1.
Each subsample is further divided into firm years that are not debt capacity constrained
(NDCC) and those that are (DCC). The debt capacity constraint sort variables are the
average future financing deficit and the industry-adjusted debt to assets ratio. The
3

R&D expense is set to zero if reported as missing in Compustat.
See Appendix for the list of variables set to zero if recorded in Compustat as not available or combined
with another data item.
5
Carpenter and Petersen (2002) report that the first incidence of a non-missing stock price in Compustat
indicates the year in which the firm goes public.
6
The average annual Producer Price Index, All Commodities, base year=1982, is used to convert variables
into real quantities.
4
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average current period financing deficit is statistically larger for the DCC high growth
samples, but not in the low growth samples. DCC firms are predicted to issue relatively
more equity than NDCC firms, and the average net equity issues are statistically larger in
all subsamples except for high growth-large firm years. The financing deficit, average
future financing deficit, and R&D expense of small-high growth DCC firm years are
statistically and economically larger than in any other subsample, all of which are
predicted to correspond to relatively high equity issues. On average, the DCC small-high
growth firm years issue more equity compared to the other subsamples.

1.5.1 Tests of the basic pecking order model
The results from estimating eq. (1) for each of the four subsamples partitioned by
size and growth are in Table 2. The coefficient estimates for DEF are positive and
significant in all subsamples. The estimates for DEF range from 0.68 to 0.83 for the low
growth-small, low growth-large, and high growth-large samples, but is 0.17 for the high
growth-small firm years. The low value of the coefficient estimate for high growth-small
firms is not surprising, given that this sample has a relatively large number of debt
capacity constrained firms with high financing deficits, both current and future (see Table
1). The intercept term is statistically equal to zero in the low growth-large and high
growth-small samples. Although the intercept term is statistically different from zero in
the low growth-small sample, it is economically small. The low growth-large firm results
are consistent with Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). The low growth-small firm results
are a departure from those in Frank and Goyal (2003), and highlight the importance of
jointly controlling for size and growth in testing the pecking order model. Overall, the
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results from replicating the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) tests for the four
subsamples partitioned jointly by size and growth are consistent with the weak-form
predictions of the pecking order model in the sense that firms that are unconstrained by
debt capacity concerns will fill the financing deficit primarily with debt issues, and with
equity otherwise. However, these tests do not explicitly control for debt capacity
constraints and ignore any influence of asymmetric information about firm risk.

1.5.2

Controlling for debt capacity constraints
Table 3 reports the results from estimating eq. (3), which is the Shyam-Sunder

and Myers regression explicitly controlling for debt capacity constraints via the method
in Lemmon and Zender (2002). Compared to the results in Table 2, the notable
difference in coefficient estimate is for the high growth-small sample. The estimates for
DEF for the high growth-small firm sample are 0.57 and 0.17 for NDCC and DCC firms,
respectively. These coefficient estimates are both economically and statistically different
(t-statistic is 4.06), but the NDCC estimate for DEF remains relatively low compared to
those for the other subsamples. The regression results emphasize the importance of
controlling for debt capacity constraints for samples of small, high growth firms.

1.5.3

Controlling for the nature of asymmetric information
The first test of whether the nature of asymmetric information matters to the

external financing decision is to examine the independent effect of the proxy for
asymmetric information about firm risk, R&D expense, on net debt issues. The
estimation results are reported in Table 4. Firm years are again sorted by concerns over
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debt capacity constraints. The coefficient estimates for RD are significantly negative in
all samples, as predicted, indicating that increased asymmetric information about firm
risk reduces net debt issues of all firm years. Except for DCC small/high growth firm
years, the values of the estimates for RD are relatively small, suggesting that this is a
relatively small effect. In the high growth-small sample, the estimates for DEF are again
statistically different for the NDCC and DCC firm years. For this sample, the DCC
estimate for RD is –0.25, which is economically and statistically more negative than the
estimate for the NDCC firm years of –0.08 (t-statistic is 3.10). This result suggests that
asymmetric information about firm risk, approximated by R&D expense, results in a
significantly higher amount of equity issues, as predicted by Myers and Majluf (1984).
The pecking order model predicts that firms without concerns over debt capacity
constraints will choose to issue equity when asymmetric information about firm risk
dominates that about firm value. The regression results used to test this prediction for
NDCC firms are in Table 5. The NDCC firm years are further subdivided by the degree
of firm risk, again approximated by R&D intensity. Controlling for the degree of firm
risk produces a substantial difference in the coefficient estimates for DEF between lowand high-risk firms for both the high growth small and large samples. The small/high
growth low risk firm years have an estimate for DEF of 0.76, which is consistent with the
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) results for large and mature firms. This estimate is
both economically and (weakly) statistically different from the high-risk coefficient
estimate for DEF of 0.42. The degree of information asymmetry about firm risk also has
a significant impact on the debt issues of high growth-large firm years. For this sample,
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the low-risk firm coefficient estimate for DEF is 0.81 compared to 0.55 for the high risk
years.
To the extent that the level of R&D expenditure approximates the condition of
asymmetric information about firm risk, the test results from estimating eqs. (4) and (5)
may be viewed as alternative perspectives on the influence of firm risk on the security
issue choice. Both equations condition not only on firm risk, but also on the presence (or
absence) of debt capacity constraints. Note that the influence of DEF on net debt issues
is statistically significant for the high growth/large firm sample in Table 5 but is
insignificant in Table 4. This difference results from the consideration of the extremes of
the R&D expenditure distribution in eq. (5) compared to the full sample in eq. (4). These
tests provide evidence that the nature of asymmetric information matters to the external
financing decision and help to explain the poor results in previous tests of the pecking
order model for small and high growth firms.

1.6 Robustness of results to alternative variable definitions
The robustness of the results from estimating eq. (5) are checked against
alternative definitions of firm size, risk, and debt capacity constraints. The beginningperiod market value of equity is used to classify firms by size, eq. (5) is re-estimated for
this size definition for NDCC firms only, and the results are reported in Table 6. The
results for high growth firms, both small and large, are generally robust to the alternative
size classification. The difference in coefficient estimates for DEF are strongly
statistically different for the high growth small sample, and weakly different in the
large/high growth sample (t-statistics are 2.45 and 1.79, respectively).
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The standard deviation of operating income (EBITDA) is used as an alternative
measure of firm risk. The standard deviation of operating income is calculated over each
5-year non-overlapping interval. As above, each firm must have a minimum of three
observations to be included in the sample. The results from estimating eq. (5) for NDCC
firm years are not robust to this alternative definition of firm risk (see Table 7). The
coefficient estimates for DEF are all positive and statistically significant, and the
intercept terms are all either insignificant or economically close to zero. There is
economic separation between the high growth, small firm low- and high-risk coefficient
estimates for DEF (0.80 and 0.49, respectively). However, the relatively high standard
error of the estimate for the high growth/small high-risk firm years renders the coefficient
estimates statistically equal. The lack of support for the findings in Table 5 using an
alternative measure of firm risk may be due to the calculation of the standard deviation of
EBITDA using annual data and using relatively few observations (a minimum of three
and a maximum of five annual observations). The resulting standard deviation is not a
sharp measure of the variability of earnings.
Agca and Mozumdar (2003) use the existence of a bond rating to classify firms as
not concerned over debt capacity constraints (NDCC) or otherwise. For robustness, this
approach serves as the alternative method of identifying firms as NDCC. The specific
method for classifying firms as NDCC or otherwise resembles Almeida, et al., (2004).
Debt capacity constrained firm years are those that never had a bond rating over the
entire sample period and have positive beginning period long-term debt. Firm years
without a debt rating and with zero beginning long-term debt are considered to be NDCC
firm years. Table 8 shows the results from estimating eq. (5) using this alternative
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definition of NDCC firm years. The coefficient estimates are generally supportive of
those found in Table 5. Low-risk high growth, small firm years use more debt compared
to the high-risk counterparts, but overall, these firms are net equity issuers according to
the coefficient estimates for DEF (0.41 for the low- and 0.11 for the high-risk firm years,
t-statistic for the difference in coefficients = 2.73). The differences in the small-firm
values of the coefficient estimates for DEF between Tables 5 and 8 are attributed to the
inclusion of small firm years that have zero initial long-term debt when debt capacity
constraints are defined according to the existence of a public debt rating.
The alternative specifications of the variables in estimating eq. (5) generally
produce results that are similar to those in Table 5. In two out of three cases, the high
growth/small firm coefficient estimates indicate that a higher degree of asymmetric
information about firm risk leads to a greater amount of equity issues to fill the financing
deficit. This type of risk appears to matter most to the high growth small firms, and
separating firms in this manner results in low-risk firm coefficient estimates in the range
of the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) results. When debt capacity constraints are
identified by the existence of a bond rating, the coefficient estimates for DEF are
economically, but not statistically different between the low- and high-risk firms.

1.7 Conclusion
This study asks whether asymmetric information about firm risk matters to the
external financing choices of small and growth firms. The results indicate that
controlling for firm risk is particularly relevant for small, high growth firms. To the
extent that R&D expense proxies for asymmetric information about firm risk, the
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decision of the small firm to issue equity appears to be conditional on the severity of
asymmetric information about firm risk. The empirical results suggest that low-risk
small growth firms that are not concerned with debt capacity constraints issue an
equivalent proportion of debt as large, mature firms when filling the financing deficit.
The results also indicate that high risk firms fund investment primarily with equity, an
observation that is consistent with the pecking order model of Myers and Majluf (1984)
when debt capacity constraints are non-binding.
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Appendix: Construction of variables
All data are from the Compustat annual active and research files. A (*) by the data item
indicates that it is set to zero if reported as combined with another item or is missing.
The financing deficit is defined as
DEF = DIV + WORKCAP + INVEST – CASHFLOW
Cash dividends, common (DIV) is Compustat item 127
Other variables that define the financing deficit are constructed as follows (Compustat
items in parentheses):
Change in working capital (WORKCAP)
Format code 1: Change in working capital = change in cash and equivalents (item 274)
+ change in working capital, other (item 236)* + change in current debt (item 301)*
Format codes 2 and 3: Change in working capital = change in cash and equivalents
(item 274) – change in working capital, other (item 236)* – change in current debt (item
301)*
Format code 7: Change in working capital = change in cash and equivalents (item 274)
– change in accounts receivable (item 302)* – change in inventory (item 303)* – change
in accounts payable (item 304)* – net change in assets and liabilities, other (item 307)* –
financing activities, other (item 312)* – changes in current debt (item 301)*
Net investment (INVEST)
Format codes 1, 2, 3: Net investments = capital expenditures (item 128)* + increase in
investments (item 113)* + acquisitions (item 129)* – uses of funds, other (item 219)* –
sale of plant, property, and equipment (item 107)* – sale of investments (item 109)*
Format code 7: Net investments = capital expenditures (item 128)* + increase in
investments (item 113)* + acquisitions (item 129)* – sale of plant, property, and
equipment (item 107)* – sale of investments (item 109)* – short term investments,
change (item 309)* – investing activities, other (item 310)*
Internal cash flow (CASHFLOW)
Format codes 1, 2, 3: Cash flow after interest and taxes = income before taxes (item
123) + extraordinary items and discontinued operations (item 124)* + depreciation and
amortization (item 125)* + deferred taxes (item 126)* + equity in net loss (item 106)* +
gain (loss)* from sales of PPE and other investments (item 213)* + other funds from
operations (item 217)* + sources of funds, other (item 218)*
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Format code 7: Cash flow after interest and taxes = income before taxes (item 123) +
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (item 124)* + depreciation and
amortization (item 125)* + deferred taxes (item 126)* + equity in net loss (item 106)* +
gain (loss)* from sales of PPE and other investments (item 213)* + other funds from
operations (item 217)* + exchange rate effect (item 314)*
Net debt issued = long-term debt issuance(item 111) – long-term debt reduction(item
114)*
Net equity issued = sale of common stock(item 108)* – stock repurchases(item 115)*
Market-to-book (MTB) is the market value of assets to the book value of assets,
MTB = 1 + [(closing price per share of common stock at fiscal year end (item 199)
multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding at fiscal year end (item 25) common equity, total (item 60)]/total assets (item 6)
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Annual data are from Compustat from 1982-2001. High (low) growth, large (small) firm years are those in
the top (bottom) third of the distributions of beginning-period market-to-book and real total assets. Firms
with moderate expected future financing needs and low initial leverage position (relative to the industry)
are classified as not debt capacity constrained (NDCC). Firms with high expected future financing needs
are classified as debt capacity constrained (DCC) regardless of their initial leverage position relative to the
industry. Market-to-book is the beginning-period market value of assets divided by beginning assets. The
financing deficit (DEF) = cash dividends + change in working capital + net investment – internal cash flow.
Cash dividends are ordinary cash dividends paid on common stock over the fiscal year. For Statement of
Cash Flows (SCF) format codes 1(2,3)[7], change in working capital = items 274+236+301(274+236–
301)[274–302–303–304–307–312–301]. For SCF format codes 1,2,3[7], internal cash flow = items 123
+124 +125 +126 +106 +213 +217 +218 [123+124+125+126 +106 +213 +217+314]. For SCF format codes
1,2,3[7], net investment = items 128+113 +129–219–107–109 [128+113+129–107–309–310]. Net debt
issues = long-term debt issued (item 111) – long-term debt reductions (item 114). Net equity issues = sale
of common and preferred stock (item 108) – stock repurchases (item 115). Where appropriate, all variables
are scaled by the beginning-period book value of assets.

Panel A: High growth, large firm years
NDCC
Total assets
Market-to-book
Sales growth
Long term debt
Operating income
Financing deficit
Future deficit
R&D expense
Net debt issues
Net equity issues

Mean
3,533.44
2.81
7.25
0.09
0.18
0.02
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.00

N=790
Std. Error
19,818.71
1.53
1.22
0.10
0.09
0.07
0.02
0.06
0.06
0.04

DCC
N=4,148
Mean
Std. Error
2,877.44
6,959.36
2.89
2.61
7.16
1.29
0.17
0.15
0.17
0.11
0.05
0.23
0.06
0.20
0.04
0.07
0.05
0.18
0.00
0.12

Difference
in Means
z-statistic
0.92
-1.14
1.92
-20.09
1.30
-6.17
-11.87
-1.48
-8.10
0.78

Panel B: High growth, small firm years
NDCC
Total assets
Market-to-book
Sales growth
Long term debt
Operating income
Financing deficit
Future deficit
R&D expense
Net debt issues
Net equity issues

Mean
29.66
3.00
3.58
0.03
0.15
0.03
0.02
0.08
0.01
0.02

N=1,045
Std. Error
11.93
1.66
0.77
0.05
0.19
0.08
0.02
0.11
0.06
0.05

DCC
Mean
28.59
3.34
3.24
0.10
0.08
0.29
0.21
0.12
0.05
0.23

N=4,142
Std. Error
12.37
2.74
1.17
0.14
0.33
0.68
0.33
0.19
0.28
0.61

Difference
in Means
z-statistic
2.58
-5.07
11.29
-27.26
9.62
-24.46
-36.42
-8.21
-9.34
-22.41
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Panel C: Low growth, large firm years

Total assets
Market-to-book
Sales growth
Long term debt
Operating income
Financing deficit
Future deficit
R&D expense
Net debt issues
Net equity issues

NDCC

DCC

N=581
Mean
Std. Error
4,566.64
13,864.42
0.98
0.12
7.10
1.48
0.15
0.11
0.09
0.08
0.02
0.06
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.01
0.06
-0.0002
0.03

N=3,602
Mean
Std. Error
3,525.04
15,141.12
0.99
0.10
6.86
1.31
0.30
0.16
0.09
0.07
0.02
0.12
0.04
0.13
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.11
0.003
0.04

Difference
in Means
z-statistic
1.66
-2.04
3.69
-27.93
-1.71
-0.05
-7.32
0.99
0.69
-2.47

Panel D: Low growth, small firm years
NDCC
Total assets
Market-to-book
Sales growth
Long term debt
Operating income
Financing deficit
Future deficit
R&D expense
Net debt issues
Net equity issues

N=1,191
Mean
Std. Error
28.40
12.06
0.87
0.16
3.37
0.96
0.07
0.09
0.06
0.12
0.02
0.08
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.06
0.01
0.07
0.00
0.03

DCC
N=4,380
Mean
Std. Error
29.32
12.39
0.91
0.15
3.43
0.93
0.18
0.16
0.08
0.11
0.02
0.20
0.03
0.14
0.02
0.05
0.01
0.17
0.01
0.09

Difference
in Means
z-statistic
-2.33
-8.20
-1.72
-31.56
-6.90
-0.49
-5.46
5.17
1.07
-3.38
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Table 1.2: Shyam-Sunder and Myers Replication
Annual data are from Compustat from 1982-2001. ΔDEBT is the difference between long-term debt issues
and reductions as reported in the Statement of Cash Flows (or similar flow of funds statements). DEF is
the difference between internal funds and investments over the period. All variables are scaled by
beginning-period total assets. Low (high) growth, small (large) firm years are those occurring in the
intersection between the bottom (top) third of the market-to-book assets distribution and the bottom (top)
third of the beginning-period total assets distribution. Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses.

ΔDEBTjt = b0 + b1DEFjt + ejt

Intercept

DEF

R2

Low growth, small

-0.01
(-5.86)

0.74
(16.78)

0.74

Low growth, large

-0.001
(-1.57)

0.83
(48.98)

0.84

High growth, small

0.004
(0.80)

0.17
(7.14)

0.18

High growth, large

0.02
(11.80)

0.68
(18.43)

0.73
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Table 1.3: Debt Issues Controlling for Debt Capacity
Annual data are from Compustat from 1982-2001. ΔDEBT is the difference between long-term debt issues
and reductions as reported in the Statement of Cash Flows (or similar flow of funds statements). DEF is
the difference between internal funds and investment over the period. All variables are scaled by
beginning-period total assets. Low (high) growth, small (large) firm years are those occurring in the
intersection between the bottom (top) third of the market-to-book assets distribution and the bottom (top)
third of the beginning-period total assets distribution. Firms with moderate expected future financing needs
and low initial leverage position (relative to the industry) are classified as not debt capacity constrained
(NDCC). Firms with high expected future financing needs are classified as debt capacity constrained
(DCC) regardless of their initial leverage position relative to the industry. Asymptotic t-statistics are in
parentheses.

ΔDEBTjt = aNDCC + aDCC + b1DEFjtNDCC + b2DEFjtDCC + ejt

Int.NDCC

Int.DCC

DEFNDCC

DEFDCC

R2

Low growth, small

-0.001
(-0.49)

-0.01
(-5.93)

0.67
(14.92)

0.74
(16.29)

0.74

t-stat
b1-b2
-0.85

Low growth, large

0.001
(0.99)

-0.001
(-1.92)

0.81
(21.99)

0.83
(47.19)

0.84

-0.24

High growth, small

-0.01
(-3.35)

0.004
(0.63)

0.57
(7.80)

0.17
(6.95)

0.21

4.06

High growth, large

0.01
(3.55)

0.02
(11.87)

0.74
(17.25)

0.67
(18.05)

0.75

0.81
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Table 1.4: Debt Issues Controlling for Debt Capacity and Risk
Annual data are from Compustat from 1982-2001. ΔDEBT is the difference between long-term debt issues
and reductions as reported in the Statement of Cash Flows (or similar flow of funds statements). DEF is
the difference between internal funds and investment over the period. R&D is research and development
expense over the period (item 46). All variables are scaled by beginning-period total assets. Low (high)
growth, small (large) firm years are those occurring in the intersection between the bottom (top) third of the
market-to-book assets distribution and the bottom (top) third of the beginning-period total assets
distribution. Firms with moderate expected future financing needs and low initial leverage position
(relative to the industry) are classified as not debt capacity constrained (NDCC). Firms with high expected
future financing needs are classified as debt capacity constrained (DCC) regardless of their initial leverage
position relative to the industry. Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses.

ΔDEBTjt = aNDCC + aDCC + b1DEFjtNDCC + b2DEFjtDCC + b3RDjtNDCC + b4RDjtDCC + ejt

Int.NDCC

Int.DCC

DEFNDCC

DEFDCC

RDNDCC

RDDCC

R2

Low growth, small

0.001
(0.60)

-0.004
(-2.94)

0.67
(14.92)

0.75
(16.43)

-0.04
(-2.85)

-0.11
(-2.35)

0.73

t-stat
b1-b2
-0.87

Low growth, large

0.002
(1.51)

-0.001
(-0.86)

0.81
(22.00)

0.83
(47.21)

-0.06
(-1.78)

-0.06
(-1.98)

0.84

-0.25

High growth, small

0.00
(-0.05)

0.03
(4.95)

0.58
(8.15)

0.20
(7.45)

-0.08
(-5.12)

-0.25
(-6.13)

0.23

3.90

High growth, large

0.01
(5.95)

0.02
(11.26)

0.74
(17.68)

0.68
(18.34)

-0.13
(-7.05)

-0.11
(-3.31)

0.76

0.82
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Table 1.5: Debt Issues Controlling for Debt Capacity and Risk, NDCC Firms Only
Annual data are from Compustat from 1982-2001. ΔDEBT is the difference between long-term debt issues
and reductions as reported in the Statement of Cash Flows (or similar flow of funds statements). DEF is
the difference between internal funds and investment over the period. All variables are scaled by
beginning-period total assets. Low (high) growth, small (large) firm years are those occurring in the
intersection between the bottom (top) third of the market-to-book assets distribution and the bottom (top)
third of the beginning-period total assets distribution. Firms with moderate expected future financing needs
and low initial leverage position (relative to the industry) are classified as not debt capacity constrained
(NDCC). Low (high) risk NDCC firm years are those in the lower (upper) third of the R&D expense
distribution. Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses.

ΔDEBTjt = aLORISK + aHIRISK + b1DEFjtLORISK + b2DEFjtHIRISK + ejt

Int.LORISK

Int.HIRISK

DEFLORISK

DEFHIRISK

R2

Low growth, small

-0.001
(-0.54)

-0.002
(-1.37)

0.70
(12.45)

0.62
(8.26)

0.50

t-stat
b1-b2
0.57

Low growth, large

0.001
(0.52)

0.001
(0.11)

0.83
(19.91)

0.61
(3.86)

0.46

1.12

High growth, small

-0.003
(-1.69)

-0.01
(-2.31)

0.76
(12.59)

0.42
(3.30)

0.53

1.83

High growth, large

0.01
(3.26)

-0.001
(-0.48)

0.81
(14.14)

0.55
(7.63)

0.60

2.03
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Table 1.6: Robustness to Alternative Definition of Firm Size, NDCC Firms Only
Annual data are from Compustat from 1982-2001. ΔDEBT is the difference between long-term debt issues
and reductions as reported in the Statement of Cash Flows (or similar flow of funds statements). DEF is
the difference between internal funds and investment over the period. All variables are scaled by
beginning-period total assets. Low (high) growth, small (large) firm years are those occurring in the
intersection between the bottom (top) third of the market-to-book assets distribution and the bottom (top)
third of the beginning-period market value of equity distribution. Firms with moderate expected future
financing needs and low initial leverage position (relative to the industry) are classified as not debt capacity
constrained (NDCC). Low (high) risk NDCC firm years are those in the lower (upper) third of the R&D
expense distribution. Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses.

ΔDEBTjt = aLORISK + aHIRISK + b1DEFjtLORISK + b2DEFjtHIRISK + ejt

Int.LORISK

Int.HIRISK

DEFLORISK

DEFHIRISK

R2

Low growth, small

0.001
(0.64)

-0.001
(-0.37)

0.67
(10.06)

0.65
(10.38)

0.51

t-stat
b1-b2
0.15

Low growth, large

0.004
(2.14)

0.003
(0.53)

0.81
(15.30)

0.65
(4.49)

0.44

0.81

High growth, small

-0.006
(-1.72)

0.00
(-0.44)

0.79
(9.46)

0.33
(3.12)

0.52

2.45

High growth, large

0.005
(2.53)

-0.004
(-2.91)

0.74
(11.85)

0.49
(6.29)

0.50

1.79
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Table 1.7: Robustness to Alternative Definition of Firm Risk, NDCC Firms Only
Annual data are from Compustat from 1982-2001. ΔDEBT is the difference between long-term debt issues
and reductions as reported in the Statement of Cash Flows (or similar flow of funds statements). DEF is
the difference between internal funds and investment over the period. All variables are scaled by
beginning-period total assets. Low (high) growth, small (large) firm years are those occurring in the
intersection between the bottom (top) third of the market-to-book assets distribution and the bottom (top)
third of the beginning-period total assets distribution. Firms with moderate expected future financing needs
and low initial leverage position (relative to the industry) are classified as not debt capacity constrained
(NDCC). Low (high) risk NDCC firm years are those in the lower (upper) third of the distribution of the
standard deviation of operating income (EBITDA) calculated over 5-year non-overlapping intervals.
Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses.

ΔDEBTjt = aLORISK + aHIRISK + b1DEFjtLORISK + b2DEFjtHIRISK + ejt

Int.LORISK

Int.HIRISK

DEFLORISK

DEFHIRISK

R2

Low growth, small

0.004
(1.64)

-0.002
(-1.34)

0.65
(6.10)

0.66
(10.05)

0.50

t-stat
b1-b2
-0.05

Low growth, large

0.004
(2.20)

0.000
(0.00)

0.80
(13.97)

0.88
(16.12)

0.46

-0.68

High growth, small

-0.004
(-2.03)

-0.01
(-2.51)

0.80
(7.54)

0.49
(4.73)

0.53

1.51

High growth, large

0.01
(3.23)

-0.002
(-0.45)

0.78
(13.00)

0.65
(10.15)

0.60

1.02
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Table 1.8: Robustness to Alternative Definition of Debt Capacity, NDCC Firms
Only
Annual data are from Compustat from 1982-2001. ΔDEBT is the difference between long-term debt issues
and reductions as reported in the Statement of Cash Flows (or similar flow of funds statements). DEF is
the difference between internal funds and investment over the period. All variables are scaled by
beginning-period total assets. Low (high) growth, small (large) firm years are those occurring in the
intersection between the bottom (top) third of the market-to-book assets distribution and the bottom (top)
third of the beginning-period total assets distribution. Firms with moderate expected future financing needs
and low initial leverage position (relative to the industry) are classified as not debt capacity constrained
(NDCC). Low risk NDCC firms are those that have had at least one debt rating over the sample period.
High risk NDCC firms are those that have never had rated debt over the sample period. Asymptotic tstatistics are in parentheses.

ΔDEBTjt = aLORISK + aHIRISK + b1DEFjtLORISK + b2DEFjtHIRISK + ejt

Int.LORISK

Int.HIRISK

DEFLORISK

DEFHIRISK

R2

Low growth, small

0.008
(2.19)

0.000
(0.07)

0.41
(4.27)

0.64
(2.61)

0.64

t-stat
b1-b2
-0.67

Low growth, large

-0.001
(-1.00)

0.000
(0.22)

0.83
(32.20)

0.72
(10.09)

0.69

1.05

High growth, small

0.003
(0.23)

0.00
(0.19)

0.41
(5.64)

0.11
(3.05)

0.33

2.73

High growth, large

0.021
(7.06)

0.010
(3.49)

0.65
(13.70)

0.73
(11.32)

0.73

-0.78
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Chapter 2
The Sensitivity of Investment to Internal Funds
When the Costs of External Funds Differ

Abstract
This study tests and finds support for the notion that financially constrained firms have
investment spending that is relatively more sensitive to internal funds compared to firms
that face relatively fewer external capital market frictions. External capital market
frictions are approximated by the costs of external funds. Examining the investmentinternal funds sensitivity relative to the cost of external funds is the main contribution of
this study. The empirical results suggest that financially constrained firms with the
highest security issue costs have the highest investment-internal funds sensitivity.
However, this sensitivity is not driven by internal cash flow, but rather by the beginningperiod cash balance. Cash flow is positively correlated with investment spending, but is
generally not more relevant to the investment spending of financially constrained firms.
The analysis shows that the beginning-period stock of cash is relatively more important
to investment spending for financially constrained firms for which security issue costs are
high. However, the results also suggest that the importance of cash to investment may
indicate growth opportunities not captured by the proxy for Tobin’s Q. The results are
robust to alternative approximations of the constraint factor.
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2.1 Introduction
The credit channel literature argues that monetary policy disproportionately
affects investment spending of firms that have relatively restricted access to external
capital markets when attempting to fill the gap between investment demand and internal
funds availability. One piece of evidence in support of the credit channel is that
constrained firms have investment spending that is relatively more sensitive to current
cash flow. Grouping firms by dividend payout, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)
find that the investment spending of firms with comparatively limited internal funds (as
suggested by low dividend payout) is more sensitive to current cash flow compared to
firms with relatively large dividend payouts. This finding has motivated numerous
studies that question the validity of the results.
Empirical challenges to Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) include Kaplan
and Zingales (1997), who stratify the low dividend payout sample of Fazzari, Hubbard,
and Petersen via a set of internal liquidity measures and find that firms with greater
internal liquidity have investment spending that is relatively more sensitive to current
cash flow 7 . Gomes (2001) and Alti (2003) demonstrate that the observed investmentcash flow sensitivity not unique to financially constrained firms. Further, Alti shows that
cash flow is informative about investment opportunities, regardless of financing frictions.
Taking a different approach to studying the effects of financing constraints on
firm behavior, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) find that financially constrained
firms exhibit cash sensitivity to cash flow, where other firms do not exhibit this feature.
In this context, constrained firms, or firms that have restricted access to external capital
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markets, bank cash for investment and other purposes. Fazzari, et al. (1988) also
postulate that cash is important for constrained firms, and observe a positive relationship
between the stock of cash and investment for constrained firms, but not for firms likely to
face fewer external financing frictions. The importance of cash to firms that face
frictions in financial markets is implicitly indicated in Kaplan and Zingales (2000) and
Fazzari, et al. (2000), who focus on internal funds sensitivity of investment spending.
Fazzari, et al. suggest that investment-internal funds sensitivity depends on an external
funds cost differential, where firms with constrained access to external capital markets
face a relative higher cost of funds. Although an external funds cost differential is
believed to drive the predicted differences of investment-internal funds sensitivity
between constrained and unconstrained firms, this issue has not been addressed directly
in previous empirical tests.
The purpose of this study is to examine whether or not investment-internal funds
sensitivity is driven by capital market frictions that result in higher costs of external
financing. This is a test of the theory in Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) and Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1988, 2000) and is the primary contribution of this study.
Internal funds are defined as the sum of current-period internal cash flow and the
beginning-period cash balance. Costs of external financing are approximated on three
dimensions: firm size, issue type, and proceeds of the issue. The influence of internal
cash flow and the beginning-period cash balance on current period investment is
examined for each cost category. An additional contribution is the investigation of the
role of cash as a liquidity factor versus an indicator of investment opportunities not

7

Other studies that investigate investment sensitivity to cash flow include Cummins, Hassett, and Oliner
(1999) and Cleary (1999).
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captured by the proxy for Tobin’s Q. Finally, this study addresses whether commonly
used methods of identifying financially constrained firms are linked to the base
explanation of higher capital market frictions.
The results suggest that firms likely to face higher capital market frictions invest
proportionately more, have lower internal cash flow but hold a significantly greater
percentage of total assets in cash. As a source of funds for investment spending, the
importance of cash flow to investment spending is not unique to constrained firms,
supporting the findings in Gomes (2001) and Alti (2003). Cash is relatively more
important to firms facing the highest security issue costs or that are financially
constrained, consistent with Almeida, et al. (2004). However, tests that attempt to
distinguish between the role of cash for liquidity purposes and as indicator of investment
opportunities do not convincingly support the idea that cash is relatively more important
to constrained firms for liquidity purposes. The results from testing investment-internal
funds responses for the commonly used methods of identifying financially constrained
firms are generally consistent with the security issue cost explanation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: hypotheses are developed in
section 2, and the research method is discussed in section 3. The data and sample are
described in section 4. Results are presented and discussed in section 5, and alternative
methods of identifying financially constrained firms are explained and examined section
6. Section 7 concludes.
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2.2 Hypothesis development
The theoretical relationship between financing constraints and investment
sensitivities to internal funds is described in Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) and
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988, 2000). Kaplan and Zingales (hereafter, KZ)
illustrate this relationship with a one-period investment choice problem in which the firm
chooses its level of investment, I, to maximize profits. The revenue generated from
investment is given by the production function, F(I), where F1>0, F11<0. The implicit
assumption in this one-period production function is that output responds to investment
within one period. Investment is financed by internal funds, W, or external funds, E. For
simplicity, KZ set the opportunity cost of internal capital equal to 1. The cost of external
funds, C(E, k), is described by the dollar amount of external funds, E, and the cost wedge
between internal and external funds, k. The cost function is assumed to be increasing in
both arguments, C1>0, C2>0, and the marginal cost is assumed to be increasing in the
dollar amount of external funds, or C11>0.
Over the period, the firm chooses I to
max F(I) - C(E,k) - I, where I = W + E.
The first-order condition is
F1(I) = 1 + C1(I-W,k).
KZ describe the effect of the availability of internal funds on investment by implicitly
differentiating the first-order condition:
C11
dI
>0
=
dW C11 − F11

(1).
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The above result predicts that investment unambiguously increases with the availability
of internal funds. Note that the result in eq. (1) holds only when E>0.
When is investment relatively more responsive to internal funds? To distinguish
between firms, a firm is defined as financially constrained (FC) when it faces relatively
high capital market frictions and must rely on external capital markets to finance
investment spending. Analogously, a firm that is not financially constrained (NFC) when
it faces relatively low external capital market frictions. Following directly from eq. (1),
Fazzari, et al. (2000) state that a necessary and sufficient condition for dI/dW to be
greater for financially constrained firms is
C11Constrained
F11Constrained
>
C11Unconstrained F11Unconstrained

(2)

where C11 is the slope of the marginal cost of external financing curve and F11 is the slope
of the marginal revenue curve. If condition (2) holds, then investment as a function of
internal funds, I(W), must be concave increasing. However, (2) relates internal funds to
costs of external funds and revenues from investment. Since there is no a priori reason to
expect constrained firms to have systematically higher rates of return on invested funds,
all else equal, the necessary and sufficient condition for dI/dW greater for constrained
firms is

C11Constrained > C11Unconstrained

(3).

In other words, the marginal cost of external financing must increase more sharply for FC
firms to have investment spending that is relatively more sensitive to internal funds.
The preceding discussion suggests the following questions: 1) are higher security
issue costs associated with higher marginal responses of investment to internal cash, and
2) are the known methods of identifying financially constrained firms sufficient to mimic
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high C11? The difficulty in answering these questions lies in the inability to observable
financing constraints. Firms that are financially constrained face relatively high capital
market frictions that possibly result in undervaluation of planned investment spending
(the lemons problem of Akerlof, 1970). Although the security issue is observable, the
amount of the issue may be less than planned investment spending. In other words, the
shortfall in funds needed for planned investment spending is likely to be supplemented
with internal funds.

2.2.1 Cost of external funds
Lee, et al. (1996) provide evidence that external funds costs differ by issue type,
wherein the per-dollar cost of seasoned equity is roughly twice that for straight debt.
Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) confirm this result and also show that differences in costs
exist within a specific type of security issue, and these differences can be explained by
firm type. More important to the KZ-FHP theory, Altinkilic and Hansen suggest that
there exists a family of U-shaped average cost curves, with the highest per unit costs
associated with comparatively large seasoned equity offerings by firms with relatively
high stock price volatility. Altinkilic and Hansen document that the marginal costs of
both seasoned equity and bond issues are increasing in the dollar amount of external
funds (i.e., C11>0). Corresponding to the family of U-shaped average cost curves,
Altinkilic and Hansen find a family of marginal cost curves, where smaller firms face
steeper marginal costs of external financing. This finding applies to both straight debt
and seasoned equity issues, and suggests that different types of firms face different
external funds cost structures.
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Important implications of the preceding include: (1) equity issuers face higher
issue costs compared to debt issuers, (2) the slope of the marginal cost of equity issues is
steeper than that for debt issues, and (3) within a specific type of security offering
(seasoned equity or seasoned debt), the slope of the marginal cost is higher for smaller
firms. Security issue type combined with firm size is therefore expected to provide a
reasonable approximation of security issue cost.

2.2.2 Predictions
The KZ-FHP theory indicates a positive relationship between investment and
internal funds, or

H1: Investment increases in internal funds.

Fazzari, et al. (2000) argue that as long as firms are separated in a manner that exposes
large differences in C11, firms with higher C11 have higher investment-internal funds
sensitivities. In other words, internal funds are more important to planned investment
spending for firms facing higher capital market frictions that cause underpricing of the
planned project. Based on Lee, et al. (1996) and Altinkilic and Hansen (2000), smaller
firms face significantly steeper marginal costs of both seasoned debt and equity offerings,
with the C11 for equity exceeding that for debt. If smaller firms face higher capital
market frictions compared to larger firms, then small firm investment is expected to be
more sensitive to internal funds as the size of the equity issue increases, or
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H2: Small firms with relatively large equity issues are expected to have higher marginal
responses of investment to internal funds compared to large firms with relatively large
equity issues.

The last issue to be examined is whether previous methods of identifying
financially constrained firms are closely related to the three factors predicted to matter to
the investment-internal funds response: firm size, security issue type, and proceeds of the
issue. Finding a strong correlation between the firms identified as financially constrained
using methods found in the literature and these three cost factors suggests that such
methods are sufficient to mimic costs of funds.

2.3 Research method
2.3.1 Measuring security issue cost
According to the FHP-KZ foundation for sensitivity of investment to internal
funds, firms must be separated in a manner that produces large differences in the slope of
the marginal costs of external financing. As suggested by Lee, et al., (1996) and
Altinkilic and Hanson (2000), debt is a lower cost source of funds compared to equity,
the per-unit cost of both debt and equity increase with the dollar amount of the issue, and
the slopes of the marginal cost of equity is higher for equity issuers. To adequately
separate firm by the cost of the securities issue, firm years are independently sorted into
thirds of the distributions of debt issues and stock issues, and the extremes of the
distribution are used in the analysis. Four external funds cost categories are created from
the sort on stock and debt issues: low stock-low debt issues (LSLD), low stock-high debt
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issues (LSHD), high stock-low debt issues (HSLD), and high stock-high debt issues
(HSHD). Security issue costs are predicted to range from lowest to highest in the
following order: LSLD, LSHD, HSLD, and HSHD. The use of security issue type as a
proxy for security issue cost has the disadvantage of being a noisy signal. However,
using the issue type to approximate issue cost allows for the inclusion of a significantly
larger number of observations in the sample due to difficulty in observing costs of private
placements.

2.3.2 Measuring firm size
The size measure used to subdivide the sample is beginning-period total assets.
Sample firm years are divided into thirds of the distribution of a size variable. Small
firms years are those appearing in the bottom third of the distribution, and large firm
years are those appearing in the top third 8 .

2.3.3 Measuring the investment-internal funds response
The regression function used to test investment sensitivity to cash flow and cash
follows the standard definition found in the literature (e.g., Fazzari, et al., 1988; Kaplan
and Zingales, 1997). While prior research typically defines investment as capital
expenditures, firms often have other types of discretionary expenditures that require
financing. Other types of discretionary expenditures include acquisitions and research
and development (R&D). For tests in this paper, investment (INVEST) is defined as net
discretionary expenditures, including capital expenditures and other investments net of
8

Partitioning the sample by firm size is also related to attempts to identify the unobservable financing
constraint, specifically Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995).
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(book values of) sales of plant, property, and equipment (Frank and Goyal, 2003),
acquisitions, and research and development expense (R&D). Like capital expenditures,
both acquisitions and R&D are discretionary expenditures and are important to growth in
earnings. Prior work in the area of investment-cash flow sensitivity also typically defines
internal cash flow as operating cash flows. For this study, the definition of internal cash
flow (CASHFLOW) is broadened to include other flows that may be used in financing
investment spending (see Frank and Goyal, 2003). Because R&D expense is included as
a discretionary expenditure, it is treated as an asset instead of an accounting expense, and
therefore the period’s expense is added to back to CASHFLOW. CASH is cash and
equivalents at the beginning of the period. Market-to-book assets (MTB) is also defined
according to Frank and Goyal (2003). The market-to-book assets ratio is used instead of
the ratio of the market value of equity to its book value because asset values are relatively
more stable for smaller firms. With these variable definitions, the basic regression
function is as follows:

INVESTjt = b0 + b1 MTBjt-1 + b2 CASHFLOWjt + b3 CASHjt-1 + ejt

(4a)

where
INVESTt

Net investment in year t, INVESTt = capital expenditures + increase in
investments + acquisitions + other use of funds – sale of PPE – sale of
investments + R&D expense

MTBt-1

A measure of Tobin’s Q, MTBt-1 = (total assets + market value of common
equity – book value of common equity) / total assets

CASHFLOWt

Cash flow after taxes, CASHFLOWt = income before extraordinary items +
depreciation and amortization + extraordinary items and discontinued
operations + deferred taxes + equity in net loss + other funds from
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operations + gain (loss) from sales of PPE and other investments + R&D
expense
CASHt-1

Cash and equivalents

Period t refers to the end of the fiscal period. INVEST, CASHFLOW, and CASH are
scaled by beginning-period total assets.
To estimate the relationship between INVEST and CASHFLOW and INVEST
and CASH while jointly considering the role of security issue cost, indicators for security
issue cost are interacted with both CASHFLOW and CASH for the LSLD, LSHD,
HSLD, and HSHD groups of small and large firm years. This modification to eq. (4a) is
as follows (firm year and time period subscripts are omitted):

INVEST = b0 + b1 MTB + b2LSLD CFLSLD + b2LSHD CFLSHD + b2HSLD CFHSLD
+ b2HSHD CFHSHD + b3LSLD CASHLSLD + b3LSHD CASHLSHD + b3HSLD CASHHSLD
+ b3HSHD CASHHSHD + e

(4b)

Eq. (4b) is estimated separately for the each size-based subsample (small and
large firm years). Following directly from the KZ-FHP propositions discussed above, the
one-period optimization problem above implies that the coefficients on CASHFLOW and
CASH are positive, or the first hypothesis to be tested (H1) is b2SMALL, b2LARGE>0,
b3SMALL, b3LARGE>0 for all security issue cost classifications.
The HSLD and HSHD subdivisions of the small firm year sample are expected to
represent the highest cost of external funds. If relatively higher capital market frictions
result in undervaluation of proposed investment spending of small firms, then small firms
facing comparatively high equity issue costs have investment spending that is relatively
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more sensitive to internal cash flow. Alternatively, small firm b2HSLD and b2HSHD are
expected to be significantly larger than any of large firm year b2.
Given the results in Almeida, et al., (2004), cash is expected to be relatively more
important to investment for small firm years with comparatively large equity issues.
Small firms that face comparatively high equity issue costs due to higher capital market
frictions are expected to have investment spending that is relatively more sensitive to
internal cash flow. Alternatively, small firm b3HSLD and b3HSHD are expected to be
significantly larger than any of large firm year b3.

2.4 Data and Sample Selection
Annual data are from the Compustat active and research files from 1982-2001. Only
publicly traded (stock ownership codes 0 and 3), U.S.-incorporated firms are included in
the sample. Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC 4900-4999) are
excluded, as are firms with major mergers (footnote code AB). To be included in the
sample, remaining firm years must report the following data items: Statement of Cash
Flows format code (item 318), long-term debt issuance (item 111), sale of common and
preferred stock (item 108), positive net sales (item 12), income before extraordinary
items and taxes (item 123), book value of assets (item 6) at the end of the previous fiscal
year, positive common equity (item 60), common shares outstanding at fiscal year end
(item 25), and a closing stock price at fiscal year end (item 199). Several cash flow
statement observations are set to zero if recorded as missing or combined with other data
items, where appropriate (see Appendix for the list of variables). All financial variables
in the regression function are scaled by the book value of beginning-period total assets
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(where appropriate). When unscaled financial variables are reported as descriptive
measures, these are expressed in real terms 9 .
To control for the influence of IPOs, observations prior to and including the first year
in which a nonmissing stock price appears in Compustat are deleted 10 . To control for the
inclusion of distressed firms, the sample is restricted to firms with at least $10 million in
beginning-period total assets. Since the empirical tests are about the relationship between
investment spending and cost of external funds, included firm years must have positive
discretionary investment expenditures and positive external funds (the sum of debt and
equity issues over the period). Total dividends per share is defined as the sum of
common cash dividends (item 127) and stock repurchases (item 115) divided by common
shares outstanding at year end (item 25). Cash dividends and stock repurchases are set to
zero if reported as missing or combined figures. Firm years with negative values of total
dividends are deleted. The resulting sample consists of 16,729 firm years from 1982
through 2001.

2.5 Results
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the sample partitioned by firm size and security
issue type. All included firm years have positive investment expenditures and external
financing. The partitioning is quite effective in separating firm years by security issue
cost. Both small and large firm years that fall into low stock-low debt issue group
(LSLD) issue zero debt and virtually zero stock. While relatively low compared to the

9

The average annual Producer Price Index, All Commodities, base year=1982, is used to convert variables
into real quantities.
10
Carpenter and Petersen (2002) report that the first incidence of a non-missing stock price in Compustat
indicates the year in which the firm goes public.
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other subsamples, the LSLD firm years have positive investment spending that is
financed primarily with internal funds. Specifically, the average small firm year spends
12% of its beginning year total assets, and the average large firm year spends 9% of its
beginning total assets. The small firm beginning cash balance is 21% of its total assets,
and the large firm cash balance is 12%. For both small and large firm years that fall into
the LSHD group, both types of firms issue virtually zero stock, and thus security issue
costs reflect the cost of debt issues. The average small firm issues 43% of beginning
assets, and large firms issue debt in the amount of 33% of beginning assets. The
beginning cash balance is relatively low for the average small and large firm year, 8%
and 5% of beginning assets, respectively. Security issue costs for the HSLD groups of
small and large firms only reflect the cost of issuing equity; debt issues are zero for both
groups. The average small firm year issues equity in the amount of 35% of beginning
assets and holds 35% of total assets in cash at the beginning of the issue year. The
average large firm year issues equity in the amount of 7% of its beginning assets, but
holds 22% of its assets in cash at the beginning of the period. The final cut of the data is
the HSHD group. The average HSHD small firm issues debt and equity securities that
total of 86% of beginning assets, and the average large firm year issues securities in the
amount of 54% of beginning assets.
Table 1 also shows the z-statistics for the difference in means tests between small and
large firm years for each of the four financing type subdivisions of the sample.
Compared to the average large firm, the average small firm invests more, pays out
significantly less in dividends, obtains a greater amount of external funds as a percentage
of total assets, and has a higher issue year beginning cash balance. Cash flow is not
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significantly different for large and small firms that issue relatively low amounts of
equity. However, cash flow is significantly lower for small firms that issue relatively
high amounts of equity. The relatively low cash flow and relatively higher beginning
cash balance suggests that on average, cash is relatively more important to the small firm
years.
The regression results from estimating eq. (4b) are given in Table 2 for both small
and large firm years. Eq. (4b) is estimated separately for the small and large firm years,
and any differences in the effects of cash flow and cash on investment spending between
the different security issue cost groups are captured by indicators of security issue type
interacted with each variable. The coefficient estimates for internal cash flow are
positive and statistically significant in every case. With the exception of the LSLD firm
years, the coefficient estimates for beginning cash are positive and significant. Recall
that the LSLD firm years issue zero debt and virtually zero equity. The significance of
CASHFLOW and the insignificance of CASH suggest that LSLD firm years fund
investment with cash flow. The general significance of CASHFLOW and CASH are in
violation of the prediction of Tobin’s Q model, which suggests that the coefficient
estimates of any other variable except Q will be statistically insignificant. Note that the
coefficient estimates for MTB, the proxy for Q, is positive and statistically significant for
both small and large firm years, yet the estimates are economically small (0.04 and 0.01,
respectively). Also note the relatively low regression R2s that indicate that both cash and
cash flow are marginal sources of funds for investment purposes.
The four coefficient estimates for cash flow are compared within each small and large
group and t-statistics for the differences in coefficients are presented in Panels A and B of
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Table 3. The purpose of the within-group comparisons is to assess whether cash and cash
flow are relatively more important as issue costs increase. None of the t-statistics is
statistically significant in Panel A, suggesting that cash flow has an equivalent influence
on investment for small firm years, regardless of the cost of external funds. This finding
is in line with Alti (2003) who suggests that the positive relationship between investment
and cash flow is an indicator of investment opportunities not captured by the proxy for
Tobin’s Q. For large firm years, the t-statistics in Panel B indicate that cash flow is
relatively more important to large firm years in which a relatively high amount of debt is
issued, regardless of the stock issue. Table 4 shows t-statistics for tests of differences in
coefficients for the influence of beginning-period cash on investment spending within
each constraint group. One striking pattern is the relative importance of cash for HSHD
small and large firm years. For large firms, cash is also relatively more important for the
LSHD group. The general conclusion from the within-group comparisons is that the
higher the security issue cost, the more important the beginning-period stock of cash is to
investment. This result holds for both the small and large firm years.
Tests of the significance of security issue costs to investment-internal funds
sensitivity are based on comparing coefficient estimates for cash flow and cash between
small and large firm years. Test statistics for difference in coefficient tests between small
and large firm years are displayed in Table 5. Beginning with Panel A, investment is
generally no less sensitive to cash flow for large firms as it is for small firm years. This
result is consistent with Gomes (2001). If investment spending of small firms is more
sensitive to internal funds, then the result must be driven by the investment-cash
sensitivity. Panel B shows that cash is no more important as a source of funds for small
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LSHD and small HSLD firms than it is for large LSHD firms. Compared to high-stock
issuing large firms, cash is relatively more important to investment of either high debt or
high stock issuing small firms. The small firm years that fall into the HSHD group are
arguably years in which security issue costs are highest. The HSHD small firms have
statistically higher investment response to cash compared to LSHD and HSLD large
firms. However, cash is equally important to investment for both small and large HSHD
firms.
Finding that the beginning stock of cash is relatively more influential to investment
for small firms with relatively high security issue costs compared to large firms with
relatively low security issue costs supports the theory in Fazzari, et al. (2000). However,
there is no general statistical difference in the influence of cash flow on investment
between constraint groups. Finding that the coefficient estimate for beginning cash is
equally important to HSHD small and large firms raises the issue of the possible
correlation between cash and the level of investment, much like that between cash flow
and investment in Alti (2003). This issue is investigated next.

2.5.1 Cash as a source of liquidity or an indicator of investment opportunities
It is interesting to note that the predictions for the coefficient estimates in eq. (4b)
are in violation of Tobin’s Q model. The beginning-period market-to-book assets ratio
(MTB) is the proxy used for Q, and the coefficient on MTB is expected to approximate
the marginal effect of Q on investment spending. In eq. (4b), Tobin’s Q model predicts
that b2=b3=0 regardless of financing frictions. However, Erickson and Whited (2000)
and Alti (2003) argue that Q is a noisy proxy for investment opportunities for small and
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growth firms. Specifically, Alti suggests that a substantial part of Q represents the option
value of long-term growth prospects, and is not highly informative of current investment
for financially constrained firms. On the other hand, cash flow is informative of project
quality, and thus higher cash flow will trigger adjustments to concurrent investment.
Both the KZ-FHP theory and the findings in Alti (2003) suggest a significant positive
relationship between investment and cash flow that is relatively more important for
financially constrained firms, but for differing reasons. The KZ-FHP theory suggests that
cash flow is relevant to investment because of its relatively higher liquidity value for
financially constrained firms that face a higher cost wedge between internal and external
funds. Alti suggests that cash flow contains information about the investment
opportunity set that is not present in the proxy for Q. Similarly, if cash is relatively more
important to firms facing higher capital market frictions, then not only should beginning
period t cash (the issue period) be relatively more significant to investment for financially
constrained firms, but also period t+1 cash should be inversely related to period t
investment.
Since the results from estimating eq. (4b) indicate that cash reserves are relatively
more important to small firms facing high issue costs, but cash flow is equally important
to small and large firms, only the relationship between current investment and the future
cash balance is examined. Specifically, the ending-period cash balance in period t+1 is
expected to be inversely related to current period investment if cash reserves are built up
to cover any shortfall in external financing needed for investment purposes. If cash is
relatively more important for high-cost issuers, then this inverse relationship is expected
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to hold only for firms facing relatively higher issue costs (small firms with large equity
issues), but not for other firms.
The results from estimating eq. (4b) with four added post-issue year CASHt+1 terms
(one for each issue cost category) are in Table 6 11 . All of the CASHFLOW and CASHt-1
coefficient estimates are positive and significant. The CASHt+1 estimates for the small
and large LSLD firm years are significantly negative. For small firms, the LSHD
CASHt+1 estimate is not significant, and the HSLD CASHt+1 is positive and significant.
The small firm HSHD CASHt+1 estimate is negative and weakly significant (t-statistic is
2.08). The CASHt+1 estimates for large firm years are negative and significant, but the
HSHD estimate is very weakly significant (t-statistic is 1.79). Most important is the lack
of statistical difference between the small and large HSHD CASHt+1 estimates (t-statistic
for difference in coefficients is 0.15). The results from including the post-issue year cash
balance do not support the liquidity explanation for small firms.
Overall, the analysis provides mixed results on the relative importance of internal
funds for investment spending by firms likely to face greater capital market frictions.
Issue-period cash flow is equally important to small and large firm years regardless of the
type of security issue. A difference between the importance of pre-issue period cash
reserves emerges most notably for small firm years that issue large amounts of debt and
equity. As a test of whether this difference is related to liquidity needs or to investment
opportunities not captured by the proxy for Tobins’s Q does not support the liquidity
explanation. The empirical results are not highly supportive of the theory of Fazzari, et

11

Table 6 results are estimated for 1982-2000 due to the lead year requirement.
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al. (2000), and corroborate the findings in Almeida, et al., (2004), Gomes (2001), and
Alti (2003), at least for financing constraints approximated by firm size.

2.6 Do methods of identifying financially constrained firms mimic high capital
market frictions?
The KZ-FHP theory claims that internal funds are relatively more important for
investment spending when capital market frictions cause such financially constrained
firms to face higher marginal costs of raising external funds. The tests in Section 5
examine if internal funds are relatively more important to firms likely to face higher
capital market frictions that somehow limit a firm’s ability to fully fund planned
investment. The combination of firm size, issue type, and proceeds of the issue is used to
approximate issue cost. However, capital market frictions and therefore financing
constraints are unobservable. Variables used in prior studies thought to be correlated
with the constraint are all based on the notion that financially constrained firms have
relatively less freely available funds in the form of cash and cash flow to distribute to
shareholders. Two issues are investigated next: first, do these methods of identifying the
constraint factor provide enough separation by differences in the slope of the marginal
cost of external funds to generate a relatively higher investment-internal funds response
for constrained firms, and second, is this response due to differences in liquidity needs or
is it a reflection of investment opportunities not captured by the proxy for Tobin’s Q.
The analysis also serves as a robustness test for the Section 5 results.
Four separate methods are used to identify financially constrained firms: firm
size (e.g., Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995), dividend payout (e.g., Fazzari, et al., 1988),
a composite measure of funds available for distribution to shareholders (e.g., Kaplan and
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Zingales, 1997), and the existence of a bond rating (e.g., Whited, 1992). Financially
constrained firms are labeled “FC”, and firms that are not financially constrained (those
that face relatively fewer capital market frictions) are denoted “NFC”. Each
classification method is described below. The FC and NFC firm years are partitioned by
security issue type and size of proceeds to compare the results with those in Section 5.
The coefficients in eq. (4a) are estimated for each classification method, and the
estimated investment sensitivity to cash flow and the beginning stock of cash is compared
between FC and NFC firm years. As in Section 5, the post-issue year ending cash
balance is added to eq. (4a) to examine the role of cash as a source of liquidity or an
indicator of investment opportunities.

2.6.1.1 Firm Size
Beginning period market value of equity serves as an alternative measure of firm
size. Sample firm years are divided into thirds of the distribution of a size variable. FC
years are those appearing in the bottom third of the distribution, and NFC years are those
appearing in the top third. This measure of firm size also serves as a robustness test for
the results in Section 5.

2.6.1.2 Dividend Payout
The common dividend payout ratio based on Fazzari, et al., (1988) is often used
as a proxy for the existence of financing constraints. The dividends-based measure used
in this study is total dividends per share, which is the sum of common dividends per share
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and share repurchases. Firm years are sorted by the distribution of the dividend payout
ratio. The bottom third of the firm years are classified as FC, and the top third as NFC.

2.6.1.3 KZ Index
The method in Kaplan and Zingales (1997), commonly referred to as the KZ
index, ranks firm years on the predicted likelihood of changing dividend policy over the
fiscal year. In this method, the financing constraint factor is treated as a continuous
unobservable variable that can take different states at each point in time, and these states
assume a natural ordering. Since the dependent variable is treated as latent, indicators of
the firm’s dividend policy over fiscal year t are used to describe the constraint factor.
The dependent variable takes a value of 0 if the firm increases dividends per share in
fiscal year t, 1 if the firm maintains the same dividends per share in fiscal year t, and 2 if
the firm decreases dividends per share in fiscal year t. Five financial ratios are used to
explain the constraint factor: internal cash flow (CASHFLOW), the beginning period
market to book ratio (MTB), total debt, defined as the sum of long term and the current
portion of long term debt (DEBT), total dividends (DIV) per share, and cash (CASH).
With the exception of MTB and DIV, the explanatory variables are scaled by beginningperiod total assets (TA). The indicators of dividend policy are regressed on the five
accounting ratios using an ordered logit specification.
For each firm, the five ratios are calculated at the beginning of the firm’s fiscal
year t based on accounting and market information from fiscal year t-1. The predicted
KZj are calculated as:
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KZ j = αˆ 1CASHFLOW / TA + αˆ 2 MTB + αˆ 3 DEBT / TA + αˆ 4 DIV
+ αˆ 5 CASH / TA

(5)

A firm with higher cash flows, dividend payments, and cash holdings is less likely
to be liquidity constrained, and so CASHFLOW, DIV, and CASH are expected to be
inversely related to the constraint factor, and positively related to the likelihood of
increasing dividends per share. A firm with higher beginning-period debt financing is
more likely to be financially constrained over the fiscal period and so DEBT is expected
to be positively related to the constraint factor, and inversely related to the likelihood of
increasing dividends per share. MTB is expected to be positively related to the constraint
factor, and inversely related to the probability of increasing dividends. By construction,
KZ is expected to be larger for firms that face lower financial market frictions.
To form portfolios, the predicted KZj are calculated for the full sample and are
then ordered from lowest to highest. Financing constraint portfolios are formed by
dividing the ranked firm years into thirds. Firm years with the lowest predicted index
values are the most likely to cut dividends over the fiscal year, and thus the bottom third
of the firm years in the KZ distribution are labeled as FC, and the top third of the
distribution as NFC.

2.6.1.4 Bond Rating

The non-existence of a bond rating has been used to identify firms as financially
constrained. The idea behind this method is that the bond rating represents the market’s
assessment of a firm’s creditworthiness. The method employed here follows Almeida, et
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al., (2004). Financially constrained firms years are those that never had a bond rating
over the entire sample period and have positive beginning period debt.

2.6.2 Results

The results of repeating the main analysis for the four alternative methods of ranking
FC and NFC firms are displayed in Tables 7 and 8. The regression results from
estimating eq. (4b) are not reported. Only the t-statistics for testing differences in
coefficients for cash flow and cash between FC and NFC samples are reported in Tables
7 and 8, respectively. The results for the investment-internal cash flow sensitivity for
market cap sorted samples in Table 7 are similar to those for the assets-sorted samples in
Panel A of Table 5. Most notably, cash flow is relatively more important to investment
for NFC high debt issuing firms compared to FC HSLD and LSHD firms. The bondrating sorted sample gives a similar result, but other clear patterns of the importance of
cash flow to a particular subset of firm years are not apparent. In Table 8, the patterns of
significant differences between FC and NFC firm years agree with those in Table 5 in all
cases, consistent with the theory of Fazzari, et al. (1988) that constrained firms facing
higher costs of external financing have investment spending that is relatively more
sensitive to the beginning-period stock of cash. Further, cash is equally as important to
investment for both HSHD FC and NFC firm years, a result that suggests that
investment-cash sensitivity is an increasing function of investment spending.
To formally test the idea that cash is an indicator of investment opportunities not
captured by the proxy for Tobin’s Q, the results from estimating eq. (4b) modified for the
ending-period t+1 cash balances are reported for the dividend and KZ index sorted
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samples in Tables 9 and 10, respectively. For the dividend-sorted FC firms, CASHt+1 is
inversely related to period t investment only for the LSLD firm years. The HSLD
CASHt+1 coefficient estimate is again positive and significant, but the CASHt+1 estimates
for LSHD and HSHD firm years are not significant. The CASHt+1 estimates for NFC
firm years are negative and significant, except for the HSLD firm years, which is
negative but not significant. The results for the KZ index sorted samples in Table 10
provide a slightly stronger, but not a clearly convincing case for the relative importance
of cash to firms with higher financing frictions. For the FC firms years, the LSLD and
LSHD CASHt+1 estimates are negative and significant. The HSLD estimate is again
positive and significant, and the HSDS estimate is not significant. The only negative and
significant CASHt+1 estimate for NFC firm years is related to the LSLD group. The other
NFC CASHt+1 estimates are not significant.

2.7 Conclusion

This study tests and finds support for the notion that financially constrained firms
have investment spending that is relatively more sensitive to internal funds that is
attributable to differences in the cost of external funds, as put forward by Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1988, 2000). Firm years are separated by the cost of external
financing, and it is the highest-cost financially constrained firm years that have the
highest investment-internal funds sensitivity. However, this sensitivity is not necessarily
driven by internal cash flow, but rather by the beginning stock of cash. Cash flow is
positively correlated with investment spending, but is generally no more relevant to
financially constrained firms, a finding that agrees with Gomes (2001) and Alti (2003).
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This result is robust to alternative approximations of the constraint factor. The fullsample results in this study agree with those in Almeida, et al. (2004) in that cash
financially constrained firms have investment spending that is relatively more cash
sensitive than non-financially constrained firms. However, future period cash balances
are not on the whole inversely related to the issue year beginning cash balance for
financially constrained firms, a finding that does not support the liquidity explanation for
the relative importance of cash. These findings raise the issue of whether cash is a
substitute for external financing or rather the stock of cash is built up in anticipation of
increased demand for working capital as a result of investment spending, a topic left to
future research.
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Appendix: Construction of variables
All accounting data are from the Compustat annual active and research files. A (*) by the
data item indicates that it is set to zero if reported as combined with another item or is
missing.
Net investment (INVEST)
Format codes 1, 2, 3: Net investments = capital expenditures (item 128)* + increase in
investments (item 113)* + acquisitions (item 129)* – uses of funds, other (item 219)* –
sale of plant, property, and equipment (item 107)* – sale of investments (item 109)* +
R&D expense (item 218)*
Format code 7: Net investments = capital expenditures (item 128)* + increase in
investments (item 113)* + acquisitions (item 129)* – sale of plant, property, and
equipment (item 107)* – sale of investments (item 109)* – short term investments,
change (item 309)* – investing activities, other (item 310)* + R&D expense (item 218)*
Internal cash flow (CASHFLOW)
Format codes 1, 2, 3: Cash flow after interest and taxes = income before taxes (item
123) + extraordinary items and discontinued operations (item 124)* + depreciation and
amortization (item 125)* + deferred taxes (item 126)* + equity in net loss (item 106)* +
gain (loss)* from sales of PPE and other investments (item 213)* + other funds from
operations (item 217)* + sources of funds, other (item 218)* + R&D expense (item 46)*
Format code 7: Cash flow after interest and taxes = income before taxes (item 123) +
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (item 124)* + depreciation and
amortization (item 125)* + deferred taxes (item 126)* + equity in net loss (item 106)* +
gain (loss)* from sales of PPE and other investments (item 213)* + other funds from
operations (item 217)* + exchange rate effect (item 314)* + R&D expense (item 46)*
Market-to-book assets (MTB)

MTB = 1 + [(closing price per share of common stock at fiscal year end (item 199)
multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding at fiscal year end (item 25) common equity, total (item 60)]/total assets (item 6)
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Size-Sorted Samples
The sample period is from 1982-2001. Included firm years have positive discretionary expenditures and
external financing. Small (large) firm years are the lower (upper) third of the distribution of beginning
period total assets in any given year. Market-to-book is the beginning-period market value of assets
divided by beginning assets. For Statement of Cash Flow format codes 1,2,3[7], investment = items
128+113+129–219–107–109+46 [128+113+129–107–309–310+46]. For SCF format codes 1,2,3[7],
internal cash flow = items 123+124+125+126+106+213+217+218+46 [123+124+125+126+106 +213
+217+314+46]. Cash is cash and equivalents (item). Debt issues are long-term debt issuance (item 111)
and stock issues are sales of common and preferred stock (item 108). Total assets are beginning-period in
1982 dollars and all other variables are scaled by the beginning-period book value of assets, where
appropriate.

Panel A: Low stock, low debt issues
Small
Total assets
Market value equity
Investment
Common dividends
Total dividends
Internal cash flow
Market-to-book
Debt issues
Stock issues
Cash

Mean
26.62
33.91
0.12
0.01
0.10
0.12
1.49
0.00
0.00
0.21

N=945
Std. Error
11.67
39.00
0.16
0.02
0.40
0.22
0.98
0.00
0.00
0.21

Panel B: Low stock, high debt issues
Small
Total assets
Market value equity
Investment
Common dividends
Total dividends
Internal cash flow
Market-to-book
Debt issues
Stock issues
Cash

N=2,223
Mean
Std. Error
27.07
11.53
25.40
28.62
0.23
0.37
0.01
0.03
0.39
5.72
0.12
0.18
1.39
0.82
0.43
0.61
0.00
0.00
0.08
0.12

Large
N=573
Mean
Std. Error
1,050.06
2,661.37
1,104.00
5,665.82
0.09
0.12
0.02
0.02
0.69
1.60
0.12
0.11
1.44
0.88
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.12
0.14

Large
N=2,275
Mean
Std. Error
2,862.31
13,774.43
2,713.11
16,427.25
0.18
0.22
0.02
0.03
5.15
162.70
0.12
0.10
1.39
0.68
0.33
0.43
0.00
0.00
0.05
0.07

Mean small –
Mean large

z-statistic
-9.21
-4.52
3.57
-9.76
-8.61
-0.13
1.08
N/A
2.53
9.68

Mean small –
Mean large

z-statistic
-9.82
-7.80
4.79
-9.07
-1.40
0.40
0.21
6.57
-6.95
10.63

67

Table 2.1 (continued)
Panel C: High stock, low debt issues
Small
Total assets
Market value equity
Investment
Common dividends
Total dividends
Internal cash flow
Market-to-book
Debt issues
Stock issues
Cash

N=3,603
Mean
Std. Error
26.19
11.27
97.98
127.25
0.37
0.51
0.01
0.03
0.13
2.36
0.19
0.29
3.44
3.42
0.00
0.00
0.35
0.72
0.35
0.27

Panel D: High stock, high debt issues
Small
Total assets
Market value equity
Investment
Common dividends
Total dividends
Internal cash flow
Market-to-book
Debt issues
Stock issues
Cash

N=1,799
Mean
Std. Error
25.61
11.39
57.79
78.59
0.54
0.95
0.00
0.02
0.48
10.86
0.14
0.29
2.49
2.23
0.55
1.25
0.31
0.55
0.15
0.19

Large
N=1,411
Mean
Std. Error
1,339.73
3,305.66
5,472.80
25,427.10
0.22
0.18
0.02
0.04
6.88
232.54
0.25
0.17
3.38
4.18
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.11
0.22
0.20

Large
N=1,585
Mean
Std. Error
2,118.62
7,127.49
3,126.60
10,423.21
0.36
0.38
0.01
0.03
4.50
83.39
0.17
0.14
2.15
3.29
0.43
0.51
0.11
0.19
0.09
0.12

Mean small –
Mean large

z-statistic
-14.93
-7.94
15.84
-10.28
-1.09
-8.31
0.46
N/A
23.23
18.12

Mean small –
Mean large

z-statistic
-11.69
-11.72
7.55
-9.55
-1.91
-4.14
3.52
3.59
14.05
11.22

68

Table 2.2: Investment Response to Cash Flow and Cash for Size-Sorted Samples
The sample period is from 1982-2001. Included firm years have positive discretionary expenditures and
external financing. Small (large) firm years are the lower (upper) third of the distribution of beginning
period total assets in any given year. Firm years are independently sorted into thirds of the distributions of
equity and debt issues and are classified as low stock-low debt (LSLD), low stock-high debt (LSHD), high
stock-low debt (HSLD), or high stock-high debt (HSHD) if the firm years falls into the bottom (low) or top
(high) of the two distributions. Indicator variables are used to isolate the marginal effects of cash flow (CF)
and cash (CASH) on investment spending for each security issue type. Market-to-book (MTB) is the
beginning-period market value of assets divided by beginning assets. Standard errors are corrected
according to White’s procedure, and asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses.

INVESTjt = b0+b1MTBjt-1+b2CFjt+b3CASHjt-1+ejt

Small

Large

Intercept

0.07
(3.51)

0.05
(6.88)

MTB

0.04
(6.04)

0.01
(4.44)

CFLSLD

0.39
(2.41)

0.49
(2.64)

CFLSHD

0.38
(3.77)

0.94
(10.70)

CFHSLD

0.35
(7.67)

0.48
(14.38)

CFHSHD

0.95
(2.95)

1.02
(11.95)

CASHLSLD

-0.03
(-0.68)

-0.04
(-0.84)

CASHLSHD

0.55
(5.88)

0.43
(5.62)

CASHHSLD

0.36
(7.42)

0.15
(5.46)

CASHHSHD

1.32
(7.74)

0.89
(8.09)

0.19

0.30

R2
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Table 2.3: Within-Group Comparisons of Coefficient Estimates for Cash Flow
The sample period is from 1982-2001. Included firm years have positive discretionary expenditures and
external financing. Small (large) firm years are the lower (upper) third of the distribution of beginning
period total assets in any given year. Firm years are independently sorted into thirds of the distributions of
equity and debt issues and are classified as low stock-low debt (LSLD), low stock-high debt (LSHD), high
stock-low debt (HSLD), or high stock-high debt (HSHD) if the firm year falls into the bottom (low) or top
(high) of the two distributions. Indicator variables are used to isolate the marginal effects of cash flow (CF)
on investment spending for each security issue type. In Panels A and B, coefficient estimates for cash flow
(CF) in Table 2 are compared within the small and large groups (row estimate compared to column
estimate), and t-statistics for the difference in coefficients are in the tables.

Panel A: Small firms
LSLD
LSHD
HSLD
HSHD

LSLD
--0.04
-0.21
1.16

LSHD

HSLD

HSHD

--0.22
1.36

-1.65

--

LSLD
-1.65
-0.03
1.97

LSHD

HSLD

HSHD

--3.77
0.48

-4.54

--

Panel B: Large firms
LSLD
LSHD
HSLD
HSHD
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Table 2.4: Within-Group Comparisons of Coefficient Estimates for Cash
The sample period is from 1982-2001. Included firm years have positive discretionary expenditures and
external financing. Small (large) firm years are the lower (upper) third of the distribution of beginning
period total assets in any given year. Firm years are independently sorted into thirds of the distributions of
equity and debt issues and are classified as low stock-low debt (LSLD), low stock-high debt (LSHD), high
stock-low debt (HSLD), or high stock-high debt (HSHD) if the firm years fall into the bottom (low) or top
(high) of the two distributions. Indicator variables are used to isolate the marginal effects of cash (CASH)
on investment spending for each security issue type. In Panels A and B, coefficient estimates for cash
(CASH) in Table 2 are compared within the small and large groups (row estimate compared to column
estimate), and t-statistics for the difference in coefficients are in the tables.

Panel A: Small firms
LSLD
LSHD
HSLD
HSHD

LSLD
-4.05
3.98
6.11

LSHD

HSLD

HSHD

--1.31
2.91

-4.35

--

LSLD
-3.68
2.40
5.77

LSHD

HSLD

HSHD

--2.74
2.51

-5.46

--

Panel B: Large firms
LSLD
LSHD
HSLD
HSHD
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Table 2.5: Between-Group Comparisons of Coefficient Estimates
The sample period is from 1982-2001. Included firm years have positive discretionary expenditures and
external financing. Small (large) firm years are the lower (upper) third of the distribution of beginning
period total assets in any given year. Firm years are independently sorted into thirds of the distributions of
equity and debt issues and are classified as low stock-low debt (LSLD), low stock-high debt (LSHD), high
stock-low debt (HSLD), or high stock-high debt (HSHD) if the firm years fall into the bottom (low) or top
(high) of the two distributions. Indicator variables are used to isolate the marginal effects of cash flow (CF)
and cash (CASH) on investment spending for each security issue type. In Panels A and B, coefficient
estimates for cash flow (CF) and cash (CASH) in Table 2 are compared between the small and large groups
(row estimate compared to column estimate), and t-statistics for the difference in coefficients are in the
tables.

Panel A: Cash Flow

Small

LSLD
LSHD
HSLD
HSHD

Large
LSLD
-0.29
-0.39
-0.62
0.91

LSHD
-2.21
-2.99
-4.47
0.03

HSLD
-0.48
-0.78
-1.73
1.32

HSHD
-2.57
-3.47
-5.18
-0.17

Large
LSLD
0.09
4.09
4.04
6.13

LSHD
-3.63
0.75
-0.49
3.64

HSLD
-2.31
3.38
2.90
5.96

HSHD
-5.74
-1.66
-3.31
1.53

Panel B: Beginning Cash

Small

LSLD
LSHD
HSLD
HSHD
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Table 2.6: Investment Response to Cash Flow, Issue Year Cash, and Post-issue
Year Cash for Size-Sorted Samples
The sample period is from 1982-2000. Included firm years have positive discretionary expenditures and
external financing. Small (large) firm years are the lower (upper) third of the distribution of beginning
period total assets in any given year. Firm years are independently sorted into thirds of the distributions of
equity and debt issues and are classified as low stock-low debt (LSLD), low stock-high debt (LSHD), high
stock-low debt (HSLD), or high stock-high debt (HSHD) if the firm years falls into the bottom (low) or top
(high) of the two distributions. Indicator variables are used to isolate the marginal effects of cash flow
(CF), beginning-period issue year cash balance (CASH(t-1)), and the ending-period post-issue year cash
balance in year t+1 (CASH(t+1)) on investment spending for each security issue type. Market-to-book
(MTB) is the beginning-period market value of assets divided by beginning assets. Standard errors are
corrected according to White’s procedure, and asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses.

INVESTjt = b0+b1MTBjt-1+b2CFjt+b3CASHjt-1+ b4CASHjt+1+ejt

Small

Large

Intercept

0.07
(3.02)

0.06
(6.73)

MTB

0.04
(5.49)

0.01
(4.06)

CFLSLD

0.41
(2.83)

0.52
(2.85)

CFLSHD

0.37
(3.20)

1.02
(10.65)

CFHSLD

0.32
(5.93)

0.50
(13.26)

CFHSHD

0.97
(2.70)

1.10
(10.87)

CASHLSLD(t-1)

0.14
(2.99)

0.18
(2.35)

CASHLSHD(t-1)

0.63
(5.16)

0.72
(6.59)

CASHHSLD(t-1)

0.22
(3.86)

0.27
(6.08)

CASHHSHD(t-1)

1.57
(6.57)

1.13
(6.55)

CASHLSLD(t+1)

-0.25
(-4.24)

-0.30
(-2.15)

CASHLSHD(t+1)

-0.07
(-0.32)

-0.56
(-5.92)

CASHHSLD(t+1)

0.20
(3.32)

-0.15
(-3.40)

CASHHSHD(t+1)

-0.36
(-2.08)

-0.42
(-1.79)

0.20

0.32

R2
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Table 2.7: Robustness to Alternative Proxies for the Constraint Factor, BetweenGroup Comparisons of Coefficient Estimates for Cash Flow
The sample period is from 1982-2001. Included firm years have positive discretionary expenditures and
external financing. In Panels A through C, a firm year in any given year is classified as financially
constrained (FC) or not financially constrained (NFC) if the observation falls into the lower (upper) third of
the distribution of the KZ index (Panel A), beginning-period total assets (Panel B), or beginning-period
market-to-book equity (Panel C). In Panel D, a firm year is classified as FC if the firm does not have a
bond rating over the entire sample period, and NFC otherwise. Firm years are independently sorted into
thirds of the distributions of equity and debt issues and are classified as low stock-low debt (LSLD), low
stock-high debt (LSHD), high stock-low debt (HSLD), or high stock-high debt (HSHD) if the firm year
falls into the bottom (low) or top (high) of the two distributions. In each panel, coefficient estimates for
CASHFLOW (not shown) are compared between the FC and NFC groups (row estimate compared to
column estimate), and t-statistics for the difference in coefficients are in the tables.

Panel A: Size (Market Value of Equity)
NFC
LSLD
-1.17
FC
LSLD
0.20
LSHD
-0.38
HSLD
1.58
HSHD

LSHD
-3.48
-1.34
-2.59
1.03

HSLD
-1.89
0.77
-0.25
2.24

HSHD
-3.72
-1.83
-3.00
0.63

NFC
LSLD
0.61
0.86
0.83
1.86

LSHD
-1.22
-1.54
-2.55
0.21

HSLD
0.40
0.58
0.41
1.68

HSHD
-1.58
-1.85
-2.46
-0.51

NFC
LSLD
2.20
2.76
3.30
2.50

LSHD
-0.02
0.01
-0.43
1.08

HSLD
1.47
1.84
1.91
2.11

HSHD
-0.78
-0.85
-1.55
0.65

NFC
LSLD
-2.03
-0.08
-0.82
0.63

LSHD
-3.47
-1.29
-2.41
0.01

HSLD
-2.35
0.56
-0.37
1.06

HSHD
-5.16
-3.19
-4.51
-1.21

Panel B: Dividend Payout

FC

LSLD
LSHD
HSLD
HSHD

Panel C: KZ Index

FC

LSLD
LSHD
HSLD
HSHD

Panel D: Bond Rating

FC

LSLD
LSHD
HSLD
HSHD
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Table 2.8: Robustness to Alternative Proxies for the Constraint Factor, BetweenGroup Comparisons of Coefficient Estimates for Cash
The sample period is from 1982-2001. Included firm years have positive discretionary expenditures and
external financing. In Panels A through C, a firm year in any given year is classified as financially
constrained (FC) or not financially constrained (NFC) if the observation falls into the lower (upper) third of
the distribution of the KZ index (Panel A), beginning-period total assets (Panel B), or beginning-period
market-to-book equity (Panel C). In Panel D, a firm year is classified as FC if the firm does not have a
bond rating over the entire sample period, and NFC otherwise. Firm years are independently sorted into
thirds of the distributions of equity and debt issues and are classified as low stock-low debt (LSLD), low
stock-high debt (LSHD), high stock-low debt (HSLD), or high stock-high debt (HSHD) if the firm year
falls into the bottom (low) or top (high) of the two distributions. In each panel, coefficient estimates for
CASH (not shown) are compared between the FC and NFC groups (row estimate compared to column
estimate), and t-statistics for the difference in coefficients are in the tables.

Panel A: Size (Market Value of Equity)
NFC
LSLD
1.10
FC
LSLD
3.24
LSHD
2.47
HSLD
3.71
HSHD

LSHD
-2.62
-0.07
-1.31
2.04

HSLD
-2.48
1.36
-0.26
3.02

HSHD
-4.89
-2.01
-3.52
0.98

NFC
LSLD
-0.26
4.60
4.94
8.63

LSHD
-2.85
1.48
0.37
4.54

HSLD
-1.95
3.15
2.57
6.91

HSHD
-3.30
-1.09
-1.99
0.47

NFC
LSLD
2.42
5.06
6.26
8.84

LSHD
-1.84
0.63
0.19
3.69

HSLD
0.58
3.41
3.79
7.09

HSHD
-3.49
-1.19
-1.89
1.56

NFC
LSLD
0.72
4.22
4.89
6.76

LSHD
-3.50
0.79
0.00
3.88

HSLD
-3.07
2.17
1.79
5.41

HSHD
-5.91
-1.92
-3.25
1.20

Panel B: Dividend Payout

FC

LSLD
LSHD
HSLD
HSHD

Panel C: KZ Index

FC

LSLD
LSHD
HSLD
HSHD

Panel D: Bond Rating

FC

LSLD
LSHD
HSLD
HSHD
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Table 2.9: Investment Response to Cash Flow, Issue Year Cash, and Post-issue
Year Cash for Dividend-Sorted Samples
The sample period is from 1982-2000. Included firm years have positive discretionary expenditures and
external financing. FC (NFC) firm years are the lower (upper) third of the distribution of beginning period
total dividends per share in any given year. Firm years are independently sorted into thirds of the
distributions of equity and debt issues and are classified as low stock-low debt (LSLD), low stock-high debt
(LSHD), high stock-low debt (HSLD), or high stock-high debt (HSHD) if the firm years falls into the
bottom (low) or top (high) of the two distributions. Indicator variables are used to isolate the marginal
effects of cash flow (CF), beginning-period issue year cash balance (CASH(t-1)), and the ending-period
post-issue year cash balance in year t+1 (CASH(t+1)) on investment spending for each security issue type.
Market-to-book (MTB) is the beginning-period market value of assets divided by beginning assets.
Standard errors are corrected according to White’s procedure, and asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses.

INVESTjt = b0+b1MTBjt-1+b2CFjt+b3CASHjt-1+ b4CASHjt+1+ejt

FC

NFC

Intercept

0.11
(6.74)

0.05
(2.59)

MTB

0.03
(5.67)

0.02
(2.05)

CFLSLD

0.41
(2.64)

0.24
(2.62)

CFLSHD

0.40
(3.20)

0.77
(6.90)

CFHSLD

0.33
(6.62)

0.29
(2.85)

CFHSHD

0.89
(3.60)

1.07
(3.90)

CASHLSLD(t-1)

0.10
(2.37)

0.08
(1.75)

CASHLSHD(t-1)

0.73
(5.81)

0.48
(6.33)

CASHHSLD(t-1)

0.23
(4.37)

0.17
(2.17)

CASHHSHD(t-1)

1.18
(8.95)

1.33
(3.95)

CASHLSLD(t+1)

-0.25
(-4.20)

-0.17
(-4.13)

CASHLSHD(t+1)

-0.27
(-1.40)

-0.39
(-3.35)

CASHHSLD(t+1)

0.16
(2.83)

-0.09
(-0.89)

CASHHSHD(t+1)

-0.22
(-1.49)

-0.86
(-2.47)

0.23

0.25

R2
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Table 2.10: Investment Response to Cash Flow, Issue Year Cash, and Post-issue
Year Cash for Samples Sorted on the KZ Index
The sample period is from 1982-2000. Included firm years have positive discretionary expenditures and
external financing. FC (NFC) firm years are the lower (upper) third of the distribution of the KZ index in
any given year. Firm years are independently sorted into thirds of the distributions of equity and debt
issues and are classified as low stock-low debt (LSLD), low stock-high debt (LSHD), high stock-low debt
(HSLD), or high stock-high debt (HSHD) if the firm years falls into the bottom (low) or top (high) of the
two distributions. Indicator variables are used to isolate the marginal effects of cash flow (CF), beginningperiod issue year cash balance (CASH(t-1)), and the ending-period post-issue year cash balance in year t+1
(CASH(t+1)) on investment spending for each security issue type. Market-to-book (MTB) is the
beginning-period market value of assets divided by beginning assets. Standard errors are corrected
according to White’s procedure, and asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses.

INVESTjt = b0+b1MTBjt-1+b2CFjt+b3CASHjt-1+ b4CASHjt+1+ejt

FC

NFC

Intercept

0.09
(3.62)

0.08
(3.80)

MTB

0.02
(5.41)

0.04
(2.71)

CFLSLD

0.50
(4.33)

0.09
(1.40)

CFLSHD

0.54
(4.97)

0.51
(2.39)

CFHSLD

0.41
(7.12)

0.20
(2.61)

CFHSHD

1.11
(3.03)

0.72
(4.23)

CASHLSLD(t-1)

0.20
(3.66)

-0.10
(-2.47)

CASHLSHD(t-1)

0.74
(6.44)

0.37
(2.95)

CASHHSLD(t-1)

0.25
(3.75)

-0.18
(-1.89)

CASHHSHD(t-1)

1.37
(7.26)

0.77
(3.80)

CASHLSLD(t+1)

-0.30
(-4.68)

-0.13
(-4.71)

CASHLSHD(t+1)

-0.50
(-4.36)

-0.08
(-0.21)

CASHHSLD(t+1)

0.16
(2.36)

0.14
(1.49)

CASHHSHD(t+1)

-0.33
(-1.87)

0.08
(0.35)

0.23

0.12

R2
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Competitive Structure on the Relationship between
Leverage and Profitability

Abstract

This study investigates the influence of the speed of reversion in profitability in
explaining observed differences in the responses of leverage to profitability across
industry competitive environments. If the leverage-profitability relationship is driven by
the speed of reversion, then any influence of industry concentration on this relationship is
expected to disappear. When industry concentration is approximated by calculating the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by 4-digit SIC from the Compustat universe, the results
suggest that the speed of reversion in profitability positively influences leverage, but is
not important to the inverse relationship between leverage and profitability. Leverage
also increases in the level of industry concentration, but higher industry concentration
results in a greater inverse response of leverage to profitability. This result is robust to
alternative methods of estimating the speed of reversion in profitability and alternative
definitions of leverage. However, when industry concentration is measured by the U.S.
Census Bureau Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for manufacturing firms, the empirical
results generally support the prediction that differences in the leverage-profitability
relationship between competitive and concentrated industries is related to differences in
the speed of reversion in profitability.
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3.1 Introduction

The relationship between leverage and profitability has been studied extensively
in support for theories of capital structure. Recent attention has been given to the
influence of competitive environment on capital structure. For example, MacKay and
Phillips (2005) find that leverage responds differently to profitability for firms in
concentrated industries compared to competitive industries, and comment that differences
in the persistence of profitability may contribute to the differences in the relationship
between leverage and profitability when firms are grouped by industry concentration.
Empirically, profitability of firms in concentrated industries differs from that for
firms in more competitive industries in terms of level, persistence, and volatility.
MacKay and Phillips (2005) find that firms in concentrated industries have relatively
higher profits. Further, higher profit levels are attributable to industry concentration
(Delorme, et al., 2003). In addition to higher levels of profits, there is evidence that firms
in concentrated industries behave differently in preserving profit margins compared to
competitive industries. Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) find that markups are
countercyclical in concentrated durable goods industries. For non-durable goods sectors,
markups are relatively more procyclical in concentrated industries than in competitive
industries. Lev (1983) finds that the relationship between barriers to entry and
autocorrelation in annual earnings is positive and significant. Hou and Robinson (2006)
find that firms in concentrated industries have less variable profits due to lower overall
product innovation compared to firms facing higher competition.
The theoretical influence of mean reversion in profitability on the leverageprofitability relationship has been addressed in Raymar (1991), Leland (1994), and
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Sarkar and Zapatero (2003), with varying predictions. In Raymar’s model, firms
optimally recapitalize at the end of each period, leading to a positive relationship between
leverage and profitability. Leland does not model the earnings process as mean reverting,
and in turn, finds that the leverage ratio is invariant to changes in profitability. The
model in Sarkar and Zapatero generates an inverse relationship between leverage and
profitability that is attributable to mean reversion in profitability. In this model, optimal
long-term debt is tied to long-term expected profitability. Since periodic changes in
profitability revert to the long-run expectation, long-term debt is relatively insensitive to
changes in current profits. The inverse relationship between leverage and profitability
works through the effect of current profit on equity 12 .
The main contribution of this study is the investigation of whether the speed of
reversion in profitability can explain the observed differences in the responses of leverage
to profitability across industry competitive environments. The predictions in Sarkar and
Zapatero (2003) motivate the expected differences in reactions of leverage to profitability
for firms in competitive versus concentrated industries. Profitability is decomposed into
the long-run mean, the speed of reversion to the long-run mean, and volatility. Industry
concentration is expected to be related to, but not sufficient for the speed of reversion in
profitability. Therefore, the speed of reversion is expected to dominate any influence of
industry concentration on the leverage-profitability relationship. In other words, if the

12

Sarkar and Zapatero test their model’s predictions by first estimating the speed of mean reversion, longrun mean and volatility of profits, eliminating firms which do not have statistically significant speed of
mean reversion parameter estimates, and then by examining the relationship between leverage and the
estimates of the time-series properties of profitability in a sample of 146 remaining firms. Sarkar and
Zapatero find that the variation in leverage is driven by the long-run mean, the speed of mean reversion,
and the volatility of profitability, among other factors.
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leverage-profitability relationship is driven by the speed of reversion, then any influence
of industry concentration on this relationship is expected to disappear.
When industry concentration is approximated by calculating the HerfindahlHirschman Index by 4-digit SIC from the Compustat universe, the results suggest that the
speed of reversion in profitability positively influences leverage, but is not important to
the inverse relationship between leverage and profitability. Leverage also increases in
the level of industry concentration, but higher industry concentration results in a greater
inverse response of leverage to profitability. This result is robust to alternative methods
of estimating the speed of reversion in profitability and alternative definitions of
leverage. However, when industry concentration is measured by the U.S. Census Bureau
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for manufacturing firms, the empirical results generally
support the prediction that differences in the leverage-profitability relationship between
competitive and concentrated industries is related to differences in the speed of reversion
in profitability.
A basic version of the model in Sarkar and Zapatero (2003) is described in Section 2,
with emphasis on the model’s predictions about the influence of the speed of mean
reversion in profitability on the leverage-profitability relationship. The procedures used
to estimate the two key variables, the degree of industry concentration and the speed of
reversion in profitability, are discussed in Section 3. The regression function used to test
for the effects of these two variables on the leverage-profitability relationship is also
described in this section. The sample selection is described in Section 4, and the results
are presented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 examines whether the results are
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sensitive to estimates of the speed of reversion in profitability, the definition of leverage,
and the method of identifying industry concentration. Section 7 concludes.

3.2 Predictions

Sarkar and Zapatero (2003) (hereafter SZ in this section) construct a static tradeoff model that modifies that in Raymar (1991), and incorporates the model in Leland
(1994). In the SZ model, the firm consists of a single, infinitely lived project which
generates a net cash flow or earnings (EBIT plus depreciation) steam of $xt. The stream
of earnings xt follows a mean reverting stochastic process from Bhattacharya (1978):

dx = κ(θ-x)dt + σxdz

(1)

where κ is the speed of mean reversion, θ is the long-run mean to which x reverts, σ is
the volatility of earnings, and dz is the movement of a standard Brownian Motion
process 13 .
Without considering the terms of the debt contract, eq. (1) rules out negative
earnings, i.e., the project has a positive value at all times (Raymar, 1991). However, the
firm is also assumed to have a constant level of debt until bankruptcy (Leland, 1994) on
which the firm issues a perpetual coupon of $C per unit of time. Therefore, earnings net
of the coupon payment may be negative. Default occurs when x falls to a critical value,
xL, at which time the value of equity falls to zero and bondholders assume control of the
13

Eq. (1) is the continuous time version of Raymar’s (1991) mean reversion process with the exception of
the treatment of earnings volatility, σ. In Raymar’s model, σ is constant. The short-run variance of cash
flows is constant, but the long-run variance is inversely proportional to the mean reversion in earnings in
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firm after incurring a bankruptcy cost. Otherwise, for x above its critical value, default is
an endogenous decision by equity holders (Leland, 1994). As long as equity has some
value, equity holders can decide to keep the firm running by issuing additional equity
rather than default whenever x < C.
With these and other assumptions relevant to the static trade-off model, SZ derive
the unlevered firm value, or the value of the project assets, as a function of permanent
and transitory components, as in Raymar (1991). The results are as follows: 1) the
transitory component is decreasing in the speed of mean reversion (κ), and 2) the
permanent component is increasing in κ. Firm value (total assets) inherits mean
reversion from its cash flow process. The volatility of firm value is smaller than cash
flow volatility because mean reversion in cash flows mitigates part of the volatility in
firm value. In absence of mean reverting cash flows, the volatilities of firm value and
cash flows are equal. For mean reverting cash flows, the higher the speed of mean
reversion, the greater is the reduction in project risk.
The value of the levered firm (FV) is modeled as project value plus the tax
benefits of debt less the associated bankruptcy costs. The value of equity (Eq) is the
difference between total firm value and the value of debt (D),

Eq(x) = FV(x) – D(x).

Equity is a function of the default level of earnings (default trigger), xL, which is chosen
optimally by equity holders to maximize the value of equity. Equity holders have a menu
Raymar’s model, implying that in the long run, firms with higher mean reverting earnings will have more
stable earnings.
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of default triggers from which to choose. Each default trigger has an associated coupon,
where higher default triggers are associated with higher coupon levels due to the
increased risk of default. The default trigger is also increasing in the speed of mean
reversion of earnings (κ). A higher κ reduces the volatility of firm value, and therefore a
higher κ leads to a higher xL. The optimal default trigger determines optimal debt and
equity levels, and therefore optimal debt and equity are both increasing in κ and
decreasing in project risk.
The SZ model predicts that the speed of reversion in current earnings will determine
the strength of the reaction of leverage to changes in profitability. By assumption, the
coupon level is constant and set to the long term mean earnings (θ) in the SZ model,
where a higher κ is associated with a higher coupon. The inverse relationship between
leverage and earnings occurs through the effect of current earnings on equity. From eq.
(1), a higher κ increases the change in periodic earnings, everything else held constant.
When current earnings rise, equity rises by a greater amount when κ is relatively higher.
For a constant coupon, firms with higher κ are expected to have leverage ratios that fall
by a greater percentage in response to a change in current period profitability. In other
words, the speed of reversion in profitability drives the inverse relationship between
leverage and profitability. A higher speed of reversion in profitability is predicted to
strengthen the inverse relationship between leverage and profitability, or the response of
leverage to profitability is conditional on the speed of reversion in profitability.
From the preceding discussion, the SZ model decomposes profitability into three
components of current profitability: the speed of reversion in periodic earnings (κ), long
run mean profitability (θ), and the volatility of periodic earnings (σ). Leverage is
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determined by κ, θ, σ, and other variables related to the static trade-off theory (the
marginal tax rate, interest rates, and distress risk). Because the components of
profitability (κ, θ, σ) are thought to differ by industry concentration, the model proposed
by Sarkar and Zapatero (2003) may aid in explaining the observed differences in the
leverage-profitability relationship between competitive and concentrated industries.
Lev (1983) and Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) suggest that the speed of
reversion in profitability is comparatively slower for firms operating in concentrated
industries. These observations suggest a degree of causality between industry
concentration and the length of time needed to recover from shocks to profitability. By
definition, firms in concentrated industries face fewer competitors due to high barriers to
entry. A positive shock to profitability may allow firms in concentrated industries to
sustain profits above the long run mean for a longer duration than in competitive
industries. However, individual firms operating in concentrated industries may have
relatively fast reversion in profitability depending on the nature of the shock to
profitability. For example, if one firm enjoys above normal current profitability due to a
successful product innovation, this innovation may be quickly copied by its competitors,
resulting in a loss in market share and/or market saturation over time. A second probable
influence on the speed of reversion in profitability is the cyclicality of the product
market. Therefore, industry concentration is expected to be a determinant of, but not
sufficient for the speed of reversion in profitability. Denoting industry concentration as
H, the expected relationship between the speed of reversion and H is

H1:

κ = f (H, other factors),

∂κ
<0.
∂H
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The SZ model predicts that the speed of reversion in profitability (κ) is expected to be
positively related to leverage due to its risk-reducing feature, or

H2:

∂LEV
>0.
∂κ

The main contribution of the SZ model is the prediction about the cause of the inverse
relationship between leverage and profitability. When current profitability is
decomposed into its various components (κ, θ, and σ), the speed of reversion in
profitability is predicted to be the main driver of the inverse relationship between
leverage and current profitability, or

H3:

d (dLEV / dx )
<0.
dκ

Since industry concentration is expected to be related to, but not sufficient for the
speed of reversion in profitability, then the speed of reversion is expected to dominate
any influence of industry concentration on the leverage-profitability relationship. This
prediction stated in hypothesis form as:

H4:

d (dLEV / dx )
= 0.
dH
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In the SZ model, leverage increases in long-run mean profitability (θ) and decreases
in earnings volatility (σ), but the effect of σ on leverage is weaker with a higher κ. Firms
in concentrated industries have higher profitability on average (e.g., Delorme, et al.,
2003; MacKay and Phillips, 2005). Hou and Robinson (2006) suggest that firms in
concentrated industries have lower cash flow volatility due to relatively less product
innovation. If the degree of industry concentration approximates both θ and σ, then
leverage is expected to increase in industry concentration, or

H5:

∂LEV
> 0.
∂H

To summarize, theory and observed relationships suggest that the speed of reversion
in profitability is sufficient to explain why leverage-profitability relationships differ
between industry competitive structures. The level of competition is expected to weakly
represent the speed of reversion, and therefore should be dominated by the speed of
reversion in the leverage-profitability relationship. The level of competition is also
expected to represent the level of long-run profitability as well as earnings volatility, and
is therefore expected to have an independent influence on leverage.

3.3 Empirical method

Tests of the above hypotheses require measurement of two experimental
variables, the degree of industry concentration and the speed of reversion in profitability.
The methods for estimating the two experimental variables are discussed in the first two
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subsections. The description of the model used to estimate the hypothesized relationships
between leverage and profitability follows.

3.3.1 Estimating industry concentration

The U.S. Census Bureau constructs the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) by 4digit SIC code for manufacturing firms every five years beginning in 1992. While the
U.S. Census Bureau HHI is constructed using sales for the 50 largest firms in an industry,
these data only include manufacturing firms and do not indicate industry concentration
prior to 1992. To overcome the limitations associated with the U.S. Census Bureau HHI,
the degree of industry concentration is constructed by using all firms in the Compustat
universe with positive sales. The HHI is calculated by 4-digit SIC code for each year in
the sample, then each HHI is scaled by 10,000 to express the number in percentage terms.
The primary advantages of creating the HHI are the inclusion of a broader sample
of industries as well as annual variation in the HHI dating to the beginning of the sample
period, which is 1982. Constructing the HHI with Compustat data has the disadvantage
of excluding privately held firms and other firms that are not included in the database
over the sample period. Therefore, the constructed HHI is likely to be a noisy
approximation of the degree of industry concentration.
According to U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1997
guidelines, a firm with an industry HHI of less than 1,000 is classified as belonging to an
unconcentrated industry, a moderately concentrated industry for an HHI between 1,000
and 1,800, and a concentrated industry if the HHI exceeds 1,800. These classifications
are used in the analysis.
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3.3.2 Estimating the components of profitability

The mean reversion parameter (κ), long run mean profitability (θ), and earnings
variability (σ) are estimated for each firm using the method of Sarkar and Zapatero
(2003), in which the percentage change in current profitability (Et) is regressed on a
constant and the inverse of last-period’s profitability, or

(Et/Et-1) – 1 = a0 + a1 1/Et-1 + ut.

(2)

The intercept (a0) is equivalent to –κ, the (negative of the) speed of mean reversion from
eq. (1), θ is calculated as –a1/ a0, and σ is estimated by the standard deviation of the
residuals. Profitability (E) is defined as annual earnings before interest, taxes, and
depreciation (EBITDA) divided by total assets. The time series used to estimate the
parameters is from 1983-2000, and included firms have a 19-year survivor requirement
(one lag year is needed). Only firms with intercept estimates from eq. (2) that are less
than or equal to zero 14 are retained in the sample. For empirical purposes, the estimated
speed of reversion in profitability is “K”, long run mean profitability is THETA, and
earnings volatility is SIGMA.
K is expected to be a function of, but not fully determined by the degree of
industry concentration. The Pearson correlation coefficient for K and H is calculated to
test this hypothesis (H1). If K is a function of the degree of industry concentration, then

14

Sarkar and Zapatero (2003) keep firms with estimates of the intercept that are negative and statistically
significant at the 5% level to ensure that the sample contains firms that exhibit mean reverting earnings.
This restriction is relaxed to allow for the inclusion of firms with acyclical earnings.
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the correlation coefficient for K and H is expected to be significantly negative, indicating
that lower speeds of reversion in profitability are associated with higher degrees of
industry concentration.

3.3.3 Estimating the response of leverage to profitability

The third hypothesis (H3) states that the strength of the inverse relationship
between leverage and profitability increases with the speed of reversion in profitability.
This interaction is an implication of the model in Sarkar and Zapatero (2003). If the
speed of reversion in profit is the main driver of the inverse relationship between leverage
and profitability, then the speed of reversion is expected to dominate industry
concentration in the leverage-profitability relationship (H4). However, industry
concentration is expected to independently influence leverage as a proxy for long-run
profitability and earnings volatility (H5).
The following regression function is used to examine whether the speed of
reversion is the primary reason for the inverse relationship between leverage and
profitability:

LEV = b0 + b1 E + b2 K + b3 THETA + b4 SIGMA + b5 H + b6 EK + b7 EH + b8 KH
+ b9 DEP + b10 RD + b11 SIZE + b12 MTB + u

(3)

All variables in eq. (3) are current period (t). LEV is long term debt divided by the book
value of common equity. The first three variables in eq. (3)—E, K, and H—are lower
order terms that support the estimation of EK and EH. EK is the response of leverage to
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profitability conditional on the speed of reversion in profitability, and EH is the response
of leverage to profitability conditional on the degree of industry concentration. KH is
included to support the two-way interaction, but is not predicted to influence leverage in
any specific way.
Profitability (E) is defined as EBITDA divided by total assets and is expected to
be inversely related to LEV if profitability is not fully described by its estimated
components (K, THETA, and SIGMA); otherwise, E is expected to be insignificant. A
positive relationship between LEV and K is expected due to its risk reducing feature.
The empirical relationship between LEV and H depends on whether the level of industry
concentration is more strongly associated with long-run profitability or cash flow
variability. If H is a proxy for long-run profitability, then a positive relationship is
expected between LEV and H. H may also proxy for earnings risk, which is generally
expected to reduce leverage.
Leverage is expected to be significantly inversely related to EK, the interaction
between profitability and the speed of reversion in profitability, supporting the hypothesis
that the inverse relationship between leverage and profitability is stronger for higher K.
The relationship between LEV and EH is expected to be insignificant if the influence of
K dominates that of H in the leverage-profitability relationship, or that K is sufficient for
H in explaining the observed differences in the leverage-profitability relationship
between competitive and more concentrated industries.
Six additional variables are included to control for factors thought to affect long
term debt levels across firms, including the estimates of long run average profitability
(THETA) and the volatility of earnings (SIGMA). The controls for long-run profit and
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volatility of current profits are included to better isolate the influence of E and K on long
term debt. Otherwise, K serves as a weak proxy for long-run profit and volatility, which
is a confounding influence on long-term debt. DEP and RD represent nondebt tax
shields, thought to be important to the trade-off theory. SIZE represents access to credit
markets, and MTB may indicate the demand for credit. SIZE and MTB also serve as
proxies for volatility of current profitability. The estimation of both THETA and SIGMA
is described in Section 3.2. LEV is expected to be positively related to THETA and
inversely related to SIGMA. The calculations and predicted relationships between LEV
and the remaining control variables are described below.
DEP denotes a nondebt tax shield in the form of depreciation expense. DeAngelo
and Masulis (1980) suggest that nontax debt shields substitute for the interest deduction
associated with debt, citing examples such as depreciation and depletion expense and
income tax credits. Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) test the response of optimal
leverage to DEP, defined as the sum of depreciation expense and income tax credits, and
observe a significant positive relationship, counter to prediction. Fama and French
(2002) drop investment tax credits from the DEP definition, and find that book leverage
varies inversely with DEP, as predicted. Adopting the Fama-French definition, DEP is
measured as depreciation expense divided by total assets. If depreciation expense is a
substitute for long-term debt, then LTD is expected to vary inversely with the level of
DEP.
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) also suggest that certain types of investments such
as R&D and advertising expense may serve as nondebt tax shields because of their 100%
deductibility in a given year. Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) test and find support for
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this prediction. Fama and French (2002) find an inverse relationship between book
leverage and R&D expense, but point out that the explanation for the inverse relationship
is ambiguous because R&D expense could also serve as an indicator of expected
investment. Because R&D has been found to be empirically relevant to optimal debt, this
item (scaled by total assets) is included in eq. (3) and is denoted as RD to avoid any
omitted variable problems. The predicted relationship between LEV and RD is inverse.
SIZE, defined as the natural log of total assets, is included to control for access to
debt markets and other risk factors, and is expected to vary directly with LEV. MTB is
the market-to-book ratio, defined as the ratio of the market value of common equity to its
book value, and is included as an indicator of the firm’s growth prospects. Higher
growth firms may tend to rely more heavily on external financing, which may lead to a
positive relationship between MTB and LEV. On the other hand, MTB may also be
correlated with the risk of financial distress, which tends to reduce debt levels.
Considering these possibly confounding interpretations of MTB, the relationship between
LEV and MTB is a priori ambiguous.
The conditional relationship between leverage and profitability is calculated using
coefficient estimates for E, EK, and EH, evaluated at plus/minus one standard deviation
of the sample mean of K and H. Four conditional marginal responses result: K low and
K high (KL, KH), H low and H high (HL, HH). The four conditional marginal responses
are summarized as follows:

∂LEV
bˆKL =
∂E

= bˆ1 + bˆ6 ( K − σ K )

(4a)

K −σ K
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∂LEV
bˆKH =
∂E

= bˆ1 + bˆ6 ( K + σ K )

(4b)

= bˆ1 + bˆ7 ( H − σ H )

(4c)

= bˆ1 + bˆ7 ( H + σ H )

(4d)

K +σ K

∂LEV
bˆHL =
∂E

H −σ H

∂LEV
bˆHH =
∂E

H +σ H

The estimate of bKL is expected to be negative and significantly less than bKH.
The estimates of bHL and bHH are expected to be insignificant, support for the hypothesis
that strength of the inverse relationship between leverage and profitability increases in the
speed of reversion in profitability independent of industry concentration.

3.4 Data and sample selection

Financial data are from Compustat annual active and research files from 1982-2000.
Only publicly traded (stock ownership codes 0 and 3), U.S.-incorporated firms are
included in the sample. Firms with major mergers (footnote code AB) are excluded. A
firm is included in the sample if the following data items are continuously available:
positive net sales (item 12), operating income before depreciation (item 13), long-term
debt (item 9), total assets (item 6), common equity (item 60), total equity (item 216),
common shares outstanding at fiscal year end (item 25), and a closing common stock
price at fiscal year end (item 199). Unreported (missing) depreciation expense (item 103)
and/or R&D expense (item 46) are recorded as zero. Firms with less than $10 million in
total assets and less than $5 million in common equity are excluded to avoid extreme
values when these variables are used as scale factors (as in Fama and French, 2000).
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3.5 Results

A total of 713 firms pass the sampling screens. Descriptive statistics for the
variables used in the regression are given in Table 1. The average leverage ratio is 0.69.
Operating profitability of the average firm year is 12% of total assets. The average speed
of reversion in profitability is 0.76 with a standard deviation of 0.65. The unscaled
average Herfindahl-Hirschman index is 2,309 with a standard deviation of 1,955.
Although the average firm in the sample is classified as belonging to a concentrated
industry according to U.S. government guidelines, the empirical tests rely on the mean
plus/minus one standard deviation which gives reasonable estimates of an HHI for a
highly concentrated versus highly competitive industry.
The correlation coefficients for the variables used in the regression are in Table 2.
The K is weakly negatively correlated with LEV (ρ=-0.02, p=0.01), H and LEV are
weakly inversely related (ρ=-0.02, p=0.06). Of interest is the lack of correlation between
K and H (p-value=0.503), an observation that does not support the hypothesis that K is
decreasing in H. THETA is inversely related to LEV (ρ=-0.05, p<0.0001). All other
explanatory variables are significantly correlated with LEV with the predicted signs.
The results from estimating eq. (3) are presented in Table 3. As in Sarkar and
Zapatero (2003), the estimate for the influence of profitability (E) on leverage is
insignificant. As expected, LEV is significantly positively related to K (t=2.50),
suggesting that K is a risk-reducing element. LEV is also positively related to H
(t=4.08), suggesting that H is a proxy for long-run profitability. LEV is unrelated to EK
(coefficient estimate is 0.21, t=1.73), but is significantly inversely related to EH
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(coefficient estimate is -10.42, t=-5.88), indicating that H dominates K as an influence on
leverage. The coefficient estimates for DEP and RD are statistically significant, but DEP
is a positive influence on leverage counter to prediction. The estimate for SIZE is
significant and positive, and the estimate for MTB is significant and positive, supporting
the idea that high-growth firms demand more external funds.
The conditional responses of leverage to profitability, displayed in Panel A of Table
4, are consistent with the results in Table 3. The conditional responses for K are not
statistically significant. The conditional responses for H are negative and significant.
For a low H, the estimate for bHL is -0.77, which is significantly different from the
estimate for bHH of -4.84 (t-statistic for difference in coefficients is -3.32 from Panel B).
The responses of leverage to profitability conditional on H indicate that H drives the
inverse relationship between leverage and profitability. Specifically, firms in
concentrated industries have a greater downward adjustment in leverage in response to an
upswing in profits. The speed of reversion in profitability does not provide an
explanation for the different leverage responses to profitability between industry
competitive structures. These results are dependent on estimates of the speed of
reversion in profitability as well as the degree of industry concentration. The sensitivity
of these results to these estimates is examined next.

3.6 Robustness of results

The above analysis indicates that the degree of industry concentration drives out
the influence of the speed of reversion in profitability in the leverage-profitability
relationship. Because the speed of reversion in profitability is theoretically important to
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understanding the differences between competitive structures, the results in Section 5 are
examined in the context of three alternative methods of estimating this variable. The first
alternative method is modeled after Fama and French (2000), the second alternative
method follows Balvers, Wu, and Gilliland (2000) and is a variation of the Fama-French
method, and the third method is a re-expression of eq. (2) as an AR(1) in first differences.
The robustness of the results in Section 5 is also examined for an alternative definition of
leverage. Eq. (3) is estimated for two alternative leverage definitions: market leverage,
or the ratio of long-term debt to the market value of common equity, and the ratio of
long-term debt to total assets as an alternative book leverage definition.

3.6.1 Sensitivity to alternative estimates of reversion in profitability

Fama and French model the change in profitability as a partial adjustment
process, represented by the following two equations (firm subscripts omitted):

Et - Et-1 = c0 + c1 [Et-1 - E(Et-1)] + c2 [Et-1 - Et-2] + ut

(5a)

or
CPt = c0 + c1 DFEt-1 + c2 CPt-1 + ut

(5b)

Profitability (E) is defined as annual earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation
(EBITDA) divided by concurrent total assets. The partial adjustment term, DFEt-1 = Et-1 E(Et-1) is the deviation of profitability from its expected value, included to represent the
predictable variation in profitability. The coefficient for DFE, c1, may be viewed as the
speed of mean reversion (κ). The lagged change in profitability, CPt-1 = Et-1 - Et-2
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represents any autoregression not captured by DFE, and its coefficient (c2) measures firstorder autocorrelation. If profitability is mean reverting, then the coefficient estimates of Et1

and E(Et-1) are expected to be equal in absolute value. If DFE does not fully represent the

variation in profitability, then CPt is expected to be significantly inversely related to CPt-1.
Long run expected profitability (θ) is estimated as the mean expected profitability from eq.
(6) below, and earnings volatility (σ) is estimated as the standard deviation of the residuals
in eq. (5b).
Expected profitability is calculated using fitted values from the following
regression from Fama and French (2000):

Et-1 = a0 + a1 Vt-1 + a2 DDt-1 + a3 Dt-1/BEt-1 + ut-1

(6)

The dependent variable, E, is profitability (EBITDA). D is dividends over the period,
and BE is the book value of common equity. Fama and French include D/BE based on
Miller’s and Modigliani’s (1961) hypothesis that firms set dividends according to
permanent earnings, and thus dividends are informative about expected earnings. The
predicted sign of D/BE is positive. V is the end-of-period market value of common
equity scaled by total assets. The market-to-book ratio is intended to account for the
variation in expected profitability not picked up by dividends, and profitability is
expected to vary directly with V. DD is an indicator of whether or not the firm pays
dividends, where DD=1 for non-dividend payers. Fama and French (1999) show that
non-dividend paying firms tend to be less profitable than dividend payers, thus
profitability is expected to vary inversely with DD.
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Eqs. (6) and (5b) are estimated for each firm with a 19-year continuous
profitability series from 1982-2000, among other data requirements. The statistical
significance of the speed of mean reversion parameter estimate is not an issue in this
case. The coefficient estimate of DFE measures the marginal response of the change in
current profitability to the deviation of last-period’s profitability from its expectation.
Some firms may have profitability that is relatively unresponsive to the difference from
expectation of last-period’s profitability. These firms arguably have a relatively low
speed of mean reversion in profitability. Therefore, eq. (3) is estimated for 19-year
continuous profitability series without regard to the statistical significance of the estimate
of c1 from eq. (5b).
The estimation procedure reduces the sample to 741 firms. The average K for this
sample is 0.83 with a standard deviation of 0.44, and the average (unscaled) H is 2,279
with a standard deviation of 1,937. When K is estimated using the method in Sarkar and
Zapatero (2003), K and H are independent of each other, a finding that fails to support the
second hypothesis. For the Fama and French (2002) method of estimating K, K and H
are weakly positively correlated (ρ=0.07, p-value<.0001), indicating that as measured, H
is weakly related to K.
The results from estimating eq. (3) with the alternate estimation of the speed of
reversion strongly support the findings in the previous section. The regression results are
in Table 5. The coefficient estimate for E is positive and significant (t=3.60). The
estimate for K is insignificant (t=0.79), but the estimate for the influence of H on
leverage is significant and positive (t=3.76). EK is not significant (t=0.10), and again EH
is the dominant influence in the conditional response of leverage to profitability (t=-5.86).
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The conditional responses of leverage to profitability in Panel A of Table 6 confirm
that industry concentration is the driver of the inverse relationship between leverage and
profitability. The estimates of bHL and bHH are both statistically different from each other
(t-statistic for the difference in coefficients is -3.09). These estimates support the
leverage-profitability relationships found in Section 5. This relationship appears to be
driven by the degree of industry concentration, and the speed of reversion in profitability
does not affect this result.
Balvers, Wu, and Gilliland (2000) model the change in profitability as:

Et - Et-1 = d0 + d1 [E(Et) - Et-1 ] + d2 [Et-1 - Et-2] + ut

(7)

Eq. (7) is essentially the same representation of the change in current profitability as in
eq. (5). However, the mean reversion parameter (d1) captures the relationship between
the change in profitability and the deviation of last-period’s profitability from its trend
value, E(Et). All variables are defined as above, with the exception of E(Et), which is the
expectation of current profitability. E(Et) is estimated via eq. (6) for current profitability.
Long run mean profitability and earnings volatility are estimated as in the previous
method.
Eqs. (6) and (7) are estimated for each firm without regard to the statistical
significance of the parameter estimates. The sample is defined as in Section 4, and each
firm is required to have a 19-year continuous profitability series from 1982-2000, among
other data requirements. Eq. (3) is estimated for the cross section of firm years, and
results are reported in Table 7.
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A total of 741 firms survive the sampling procedure. The average K for this sample
is 0.90 with a standard deviation of 0.36, and the average (unscaled) H is 2,279 with a
standard deviation of 1,937. K and H are weakly positively correlated for this method of
estimating K (ρ=0.07, p-value<.0001), indicating that H is not sufficient for K.
The results from estimating eq. (3) with the second alternate technique for estimating
the speed of reversion also strongly support the findings in Section 5. The results
reported in Table 7 indicate that profitability is not a significant factor in explaining
leverage when the speed of reversion and other components are included in the
regression, and the conditional responses are dominated by the joint influence of
profitability and industry concentration, not the speed of reversion in profitability. The
conditional responses of leverage to profitability are displayed in Panel A of Table 8. All
conditional responses of leverage to profitability are significantly negative. The estimate
for bKL is statistically the same as the estimate for bKH (t-statistic for the difference in
coefficients is -0.93). The estimates for bHL and bHH are significantly negative and
statistically distinct (t-statistic for the difference in coefficients is -2.28), again suggesting
that the influence of industry concentration drives out any influence of the speed of
reversion in profitability on the leverage-profitability relationship.
The last alternate method for estimating the speed of reversion is a re-expression of
eq. (2) from Sarkar and Zapatero (2003). Eq. (2) below is expressed as

Et = α + λEt-1 + ut

(2a)
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The slope coefficient, λ, is equivalent to (1+a0) in eq. (2). Profitability (E) is defined as
EBITDA divided by concurrent total assets. Eq. (2a) is estimated using first differences
for each firm in the sample from 1984-2000, and included firms have a 19-year survivor
requirement (two lag years are needed for first differences). Only firms with estimates of
λ ≤0 are retained.
A total of 10,999 firm years survive the data requirements necessary for
estimation on eq. (3). The mean and standard deviation for the speed of reversion are
0.37 and 0.19, lower than K from other estimation methods. The unscaled mean and
standard deviation for the indicator of industry concentration are 2,290 and 1,942. The
estimates for K are again unrelated to H (ρ=-0.01, p-value=0.17).
Table 9 shows the results from estimating eq. (3). The coefficient estimate for E
is not related to LEV (t=-1.79). K is also not related to LEV (t=-0.93), and H and LEV
are unrelated (t=0.35). The estimate of EK is insignificant (t=0.20), and the estimate for
EH is significantly negative (t=-4.30). The response of leverage to profitability
conditional on H is significant only with a higher value of H, as reported in Panel A of
Table 10. H again intensifies the inverse relationship between leverage and profitability,
whereas K is unimportant.

3.6.2 Sensitivity to alternative definitions of leverage

The results in Section 5 are re-estimated for two alternative leverage definitions:
market leverage, or the ratio of long-term debt to the market value of common equity
(LTD/ME) and long term debt divided by total assets (LTD/TA). Sarkar and Zapatero
(2003) use LTD/ME as the dependent variable for examining the influence of the speed
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of reversion on leverage. The speed of reversion is estimated for each firm as in Section
5, and all other variable definitions are the same. The coefficient estimates for eq. (3)
with the two alternate leverage definitions are reported in Table 11.
The regression results for the two alternative leverage definitions generally agree
with the estimates in Section 5. Profitability is not significant for LTD/ME. Profitability
is significantly positive for LTD/TA, indicating that long-term debt levels and current
profitability are related, unlike the prediction in Sarkar and Zapatero (2003) that the
coupon is set to long-run mean profitability. As predicted, the speed of reversion in
profitability is significantly positive for LTD/ME and LTD/TA. For both long-term
leverage definitions, the degree of industry concentration is positive and significant, EK
is not significant, EH is significantly negative. The coefficient estimates for the two
alternative definitions of long-term debt collectively indicate that the speed of reversion
in profitability does not drive the inverse relationship between leverage and profitability.
The dominant influence on this relationship is the degree of industry concentration, an
observation that is supported by the conditional marginal responses in Table 12.
The main results in Section 5 are not sensitive to alternative leverage definitions
that are ratios of long-term debt to some measure of firm value. The degree of industry
concentration affects the leverage-profitability relationship and overrides any influence of
the speed of reversion.

3.6.3 Sensitivity to the definition of industry concentration

The previous results rely on estimates of the degree of industry concentration by
way of calculating the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) by 4-digit SIC code from the
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Compustat universe. An alternative measure of industry concentration is the reported
HHI from the U.S. Census Bureau for manufacturing firms. The Census measure of
industry concentration is potentially more accurate due to the inclusion of both privately
and publicly held firms in the calculation of HHI. These HHI are used to check the
robustness of the results to the definition of the industry concentration variable. The
alternative measure of industry concentration is the HHI reported for 1992, which is
approximately the midpoint of the time series. This choice eliminates time variation and
reduces noise in the measure of industry concentration. Eq. (3) is estimated as described
in Section 4 for this alternative definition of H.
A total of 4,320 manufacturing firm years are included in the estimation of eq.
(3). The average K for this sample is 0.78 with a standard deviation of 0.45. The average
(unscaled) H is 575 with a standard deviation of 539, indicating that the average
manufacturing firm operates in an unconcentrated industry. The estimate for the speed of
reversion is significantly inversely related to the indicator of industry concentration for
manufacturing firms (ρ=-0.13, p-value<.0001), suggesting that K and H are weak
substitutes. This finding supports the fourth hypothesis, that firms in concentrated
industries have slower speeds of reversion in profitability. The estimates of the
coefficients in eq. (3) for manufacturing firms differ considerably from those in Section
5. From Table 13, the estimate for E is significantly negative and large (-7.63, t=-3.60),
the estimate for K is insignificant (t=-1.67), and the estimate for H is positive but
insignificant (t=1.88). Contrary to the results in Section 5, EK is significant and positive
(3.37, t=2.68), but EH is not significant (t=0.62).
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The estimated conditional responses to leverage shown in Panel A of Table 14 are
negative and significant. However, the responses of leverage to profitability conditional
on high and low values of K are not significantly different. The results for the alternative
definition of industry concentration generally support the hypothesis that the speed of
reversion in profitability is sufficient for industry concentration as an explanation for
differing leverage-profitability responses.

3.7 Conclusion

This study tests and finds that the response of leverage to profitability is different for
firms in concentrated industries as opposed to more competitive industries, a result that
cannot be explained by differences in the speed of reversion in profitability when
Compustat data are used to approximate industry concentration. The results are robust to
alternative methods of estimating the speed of reversion in profitability and alternative
definitions of leverage. When the conditional responses of leverage to profitability are
estimated with U.S. Census Bureau measures of industry concentration for manufacturing
firms, the predictions of this study are generally supported. Industry concentration is
inversely related to the speed of reversion in profitability, and the speed of reversion in
profitability is sufficient for industry concentration in explaining why firms in
concentrated industries have leverage that is more sensitive to profitability compared to
firms in more competitive industries.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for regression variables
Annual data are from Compustat from 1982-2000. In the following, LEV is long-term debt (Compustat
item 9) scaled by the book value of common equity (60). E is EBITDA, or earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortization (13) scaled by total assets (6). K is the speed of reversion in EBITDA
(estimated via the method in Sarkar and Zapatero, 2003), H is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated
annually by SIC from the universe of Compustat firms with positive sales (12), then scaled by 10,000. EK,
EH, KH, and EKH are interaction terms. DEP is depreciation and amortization (125), RD is research and
development expense (46). These variables are scaled by total assets (6). SIZE is the natural log of total
assets (6), and MTB is the market value of common equity (25*199) divided by the book value of common
equity (60).

N = 12,834

Mean

Std. Dev.

LEV
E
K
THETA
SIGMA
H
DEP
RD
SIZE
MTB

0.69
0.12
0.76
0.11
0.52
0.23
0.04
0.02
6.68
2.20

1.56
0.07
0.65
0.08
1.06
0.20
0.03
0.03
1.98
2.64
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Table 3.2: Pearson correlation coefficients for regression variables
Annual data are from Compustat from 1982-2000. In the following, LEV is long-term debt (Compustat
item 9) scaled by the book value of common equity (60). E is EBITDA, or earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortization (13) scaled by total assets (6). K is the speed of reversion in EBITDA,
THETA is long run mean earnings, and SIGMA is earnings volatility (estimated via the method in Sarkar
and Zapatero, 2003). H is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated annually by SIC from the universe
of Compustat firms with positive sales (12), then scaled by 10,000. EK, EH, KH, and EKH are interaction
terms. DEP is depreciation and amortization (125), RD is research and development expense (46). These
variables are scaled by total assets (6). SIZE is the natural log of total assets (6), and MTB is the market
value of common equity (25*199) divided by the book value of common equity (60).

LEV
1.00

E
-0.07
<.0001

K
-0.02
0.0164

THETA
-0.05
<.0001

SIGMA
-0.04
<.0001

H
-0.02
0.0620

DEP
-0.03
0.0004

RD
-0.11
<.0001

SIZE
0.19
<.0001

MTB
0.21
<.0001

E

-0.07
<.0001

1.00

-0.04
<.0001

0.46
<.0001

-0.16
<.0001

0.12
<.0001

0.40
<.0001

0.07
<.0001

-0.12
<.0001

0.26
<.0001

K

-0.02
0.0164

-0.04
<.0001

1.00

-0.10
<.0001

0.57
<.0001

-0.01
0.5025

0.04
<.0001

0.08
<.0001

-0.05
<.0001

-0.05
<.0001

THETA

-0.05
<.0001

0.46
<.0001

-0.10
<.0001

1.00

-0.09
<.0001

0.11
<.0001

0.29
<.0001

0.09
<.0001

-0.07
<.0001

0.19
<.0001

SIGMA

-0.04
<.0001

-0.16
<.0001

0.57
<.0001

-0.09
<.0001

1.00

0.03
0.0041

-0.08
<.0001

0.13
<.0001

-0.15
<.0001

-0.05
<.0001

H

-0.02
0.0620

0.12
<.0001

-0.01
0.5025

0.11
<.0001

0.03
0.0041

1.00

0.07
<.0001

0.13
<.0001

-0.18
<.0001

0.06
<.0001

DEP

-0.03
0.0004

0.40
<.0001

0.04
<.0001

0.29
<.0001

-0.08
<.0001

0.07
<.0001

1.00

0.14
<.0001

-0.13
<.0001

0.03
0.0026

RD

-0.11
<.0001

0.07
<.0001

0.08
<.0001

0.09
<.0001

0.13
<.0001

0.13
<.0001

0.14
<.0001

1.00

-0.09
<.0001

0.13
<.0001

SIZE

0.19
<.0001

-0.12
<.0001

-0.05
<.0001

-0.07
<.0001

-0.15
<.0001

-0.18
<.0001

-0.13
<.0001

-0.09
<.0001

1.00

0.11
<.0001

MTB

0.21
<.0001

0.26
<.0001

-0.05
<.0001

0.19
<.0001

-0.05
<.0001

0.06
<.0001

0.03
0.0026

0.13
<.0001

0.11
<.0001

1.00

LEV
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Table 3.3: Regression results for book leverage
Annual data are from Compustat from 1982-2000. In the following, LEV is long-term debt (Compustat item 9) scaled by the book
value of common equity (60). E is EBITDA, or earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (13) scaled by total
assets (6). K is the speed of reversion in EBITDA, THETA is long run mean earnings, and SIGMA is earnings volatility. H is the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated annually by SIC from the universe of Compustat firms with positive sales (12), then scaled by
10,000. EK, EH, and KH are interaction terms. DEP is depreciation and amortization (125), RD is research and development expense
(46). These variables are scaled by total assets (6). SIZE is the natural log of total assets (6), and MTB is the market value of
common equity (25*199) divided by the book value of common equity (60). Asymptotic standard errors of the estimates are used to
calculate t-statistics. The prediction of “n.s.” represents not significant.

LEVjt = b0 + b1 Ejt + b2 Kjt + b3 THETAjt + b4 SIGMAjt + b5 Hjt + b6 EKt + b7 EHjt
+ b8 KHjt + b9 DEPjt + b10 RDjt + b11 SIZEjt + b12 MTBjt + ujt

Prediction
Intercept
E
K
THETA
SIGMA
H
EK
EH
KH
DEP
RD
SIZE
MTB

R2-adj.

n.s.
+
+
+
n.s.
?
+
?

Estimate
-0.41
-0.40
0.11
-1.03
-0.01
2.16
0.21
-10.42
-0.93
2.83
-6.43
0.12
0.15

t
-2.93
-0.67
2.50
-4.84
-0.51
4.08
1.73
-5.88
-3.03
4.12
-11.65
7.91
3.88

0.11
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Table 3.4: Two-way interactions, book leverage
Panel A: Conditional response of leverage to profitability
The formulas below are used to calculate the marginal responses of leverage to profitability, conditional on the speed of reversion in
profitability (K) and industry concentration (H). The conditional marginal responses are based on coefficient estimates from Table 3
and the means and standard deviations of the distributions of K and H. LEV is defined long-term debt (9) divided by the market value
of common equity (25*199), K is the speed of reversion in EBITDA estimated via the method in Sarkar and Zapatero (2003). K low
(high) is the mean of the K distribution minus (plus) one standard deviation. H low (high) is the mean of the H distribution minus
(plus) one standard deviation. Asymptotic standard errors of the estimates in Table 3 are used to calculate t-statistics (in parentheses)
for each conditional marginal response.

Marginal response of leverage to profitability conditional on the
Speed of reversion in profitability
∂LEV
bˆ | K =
∂E

= bˆ1 + bˆ6 ( K ± σ K )
K ±σ K

Degree of industry concentration
∂LEV
bˆ | H =
∂E

= bˆ1 + bˆ7 ( H ± σ H )
H ±σ H

K low

0

H low

-0.77
(-1.37)

K high

0

H high

-4.84
(-7.27)

Panel B: Test statistics for differences in conditional coefficients
T-statistics for the indicated differences in conditional coefficients are presented in the tables below. P-values are in parentheses (onetailed test).

K low > K high

0

H high > H low

-3.32
(0.0005)
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Table 3.5
Robustness to Fama and French (2002) method of estimating reversion in
profitability: regression results
Annual data are from Compustat from 1982-2000. In the following, LEV is long-term debt (Compustat item 9) scaled by the book
value of common equity (60). E is EBITDA, or earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (13) scaled by total
assets (6). K is the speed of reversion in EBITDA, THETA is long run mean earnings, and SIGMA is earnings volatility (estimated
via the method in Fama and French, 2002). H is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated annually by SIC from the universe of
Compustat firms with positive sales (12), then scaled by 10,000. EK, EH, and KH are interaction terms. DEP is depreciation and
amortization (125), RD is research and development expense (46). These variables are scaled by total assets (6). SIZE is the natural
log of total assets (6), and MTB is the market value of common equity (25*199) divided by the book value of common equity (60).
Asymptotic standard errors of the estimates are used to calculate t-statistics. The prediction of “n.s.” represents not significant.

LEVjt = b0 + b1 Ejt + b2 Kjt + b3 THETAjt + b4 SIGMAjt + b5 Hjt + b6 EKt + b7 EHjt
+ b8 KHjt + b9 DEPjt + b10 RDjt + b11 SIZEjt + b12 MTBjt + ujt

Prediction
Intercept
E
K
THETA
SIGMA
H
EK
EH
KH
DEP
RD
SIZE
MTB

R2-adj.

n.s.
+
+
+
n.s.
?
+
?

Estimate
-0.33
1.86
0.05
-4.67
0.39
1.72
0.05
-8.79
-0.55
-0.01
-6.24
0.12
0.16

t
-2.20
3.60
0.79
-5.28
0.82
3.76
0.10
-5.86
-2.27
-0.02
-12.25
6.96
3.97

0.12
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Table 3.6
Robustness to Fama and French (2002) method of estimating reversion in
profitability: statistical tests

Panel A: Conditional response of leverage to profitability
The formulas below are used to calculate the marginal responses of leverage to profitability, conditional on the speed of reversion in
profitability (K) and industry concentration (H). The conditional marginal responses are based on coefficient estimates from Table 5
and the means and standard deviations of the distributions of K and H. LEV is defined as the ratio of total long term debt to the book
value of equity, K is the speed of reversion in EBITDA estimated via the method in Fama and French (2002). K low (high) is the
mean of the K distribution minus (plus) one standard deviation. H low (high) is the mean of the H distribution minus (plus) one
standard deviation. Asymptotic standard errors of the estimates in Table 5 are used to calculate t-statistics (in parentheses) for each
conditional marginal response.

Marginal response of leverage to profitability conditional on the
Speed of reversion in profitability
∂LEV
bˆ | K =
∂E

= bˆ1 + bˆ6 ( K ± σ K )
K ±σ K

Degree of industry concentration
∂LEV
bˆ | H =
∂E

= bˆ1 + bˆ7 ( H ± σ H )
H ±σ H

K low

1.86
(3.60)

H low

1.56
(3.15)

K high

1.86
(3.60)

H high

-1.85
(-3.04)

Panel B: Test statistics for differences in conditional coefficients
T-statistics for the indicated differences in conditional coefficients are presented in the tables below. P-values are in parentheses (onetailed test).

K low > K high

0

H high > H low

-3.09
(0.001)
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Table 3.7
Robustness to Balvers, Wu, and Gilliland (2000) method of estimating reversion in
profitability: regression results
Annual data are from Compustat from 1982-2000. In the following, LEV is long-term debt (Compustat item 9) scaled by the book
value of common equity (60). E is EBITDA, or earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (13) scaled by total
assets (6). K is the speed of reversion in EBITDA, SIGMA is earnings volatility (estimated via the method in Balvers, Wu, and
Gilliland, 2000). THETA is long run mean earnings (estimated via the method in Fama and French, 2002). H is the HerfindahlHirschman Index calculated annually by SIC from the universe of Compustat firms with positive sales (12), then scaled by 10,000.
EK, EH, and KH are interaction terms. DEP is depreciation and amortization (125), RD is research and development expense (46).
These variables are scaled by total assets (6). SIZE is the natural log of total assets (6), and MTB is the market value of common
equity (25*199) divided by the book value of common equity (60). Asymptotic standard errors of the estimates are used to calculate tstatistics. The prediction of “n.s.” represents not significant.

LEVjt = b0 + b1 Ejt + b2 Kjt + b3 THETAjt + b4 SIGMAjt + b5 Hjt + b6 EKt + b7 EHjt
+ b8 KHjt + b9 DEPjt + b10 RDjt + b11 SIZEjt + b12 MTBjt + ujt

Prediction
Intercept
E
K
THETA
SIGMA
H
EK
EH
KH
DEP
RD
SIZE
MTB

R2-adj.

n.s.
+
+
+
n.s.
?
+
?

Estimate
-0.21
1.38
-0.03
-4.75
-0.20
1.83
0.59
-9.04
-0.58
0.10
-6.16
0.11
0.16

t
-1.15
1.84
-0.32
-5.39
-0.35
3.26
0.84
-5.75
-1.73
0.18
-12.12
6.77
3.98

0.12
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Table 3.8
Robustness to Balvers, Wu, and Gilliland (2000) method of estimating reversion in
profitability: statistical tests
Panel A: Conditional response of leverage to profitability
The formulas below are used to calculate the marginal responses of leverage to profitability, conditional on the speed of reversion in
profitability (K) and industry concentration (H). The conditional marginal responses are based on coefficient estimates from Table 7
and the means and standard deviations of the distributions of K and H. LEV is defined as the ratio of total long term debt to the book
value of equity, K is the speed of reversion in EBITDA estimated via the method in Balvers, Wu, and Gilliland (2000). K low (high)
is the mean of the K distribution minus (plus) one standard deviation. H low (high) is the mean of the H distribution minus (plus) one
standard deviation. Asymptotic standard errors of the estimates in Table 7 are used to calculate t-statistics (in parentheses) for each
conditional marginal response.

Marginal response of leverage to profitability conditional on the
Speed of reversion in profitability
∂LEV
bˆ | K =
∂E

= bˆ1 + bˆ6 ( K ± σ K )
K ±σ K

Degree of industry concentration
∂LEV
bˆ | H =
∂E

= bˆ1 + bˆ7 ( H ± σ H )
H ±σ H

K low

0

H low

1.83
(3.26)

K high

0

H high

1.83
(3.26)

Panel B: Test statistics for differences in conditional coefficients
T-statistics for the indicated differences in conditional coefficients are presented in the tables below. P-values are in parentheses (onetailed test).

K low > K high

0

H high > H low

0
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Table 3.9
Robustness to AR(1) method of estimating reversion in profitability: regression
results
Annual data are from Compustat from 1982-2000. In the following, LEV is long-term debt (Compustat item 9) scaled by the book
value of common equity (60). E is EBITDA, or earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (13) scaled by total
assets (6). K is the speed of reversion in EBITDA, SIGMA is earnings volatility (estimated via first order autoregression). THETA is
long run mean earnings (estimated via the method in Fama and French, 2002). H is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated
annually by SIC from the universe of Compustat firms with positive sales (12), then scaled by 10,000. EK, EH, and KH are
interaction terms. DEP is depreciation and amortization (125), RD is research and development expense (46). These variables are
scaled by total assets (6). SIZE is the natural log of total assets (6), and MTB is the market value of common equity (25*199) divided
by the book value of common equity (60). Asymptotic standard errors of the estimates are used to calculate t-statistics. The
prediction of “n.s.” represents not significant.

LEVjt = b0 + b1 Ejt + b2 Kjt + b3 THETAjt + b4 SIGMAjt + b5 Hjt + b6 EKt + b7 EHjt
+ b8 KHjt + b9 DEPjt + b10 RDjt + b11 SIZEjt + b12 MTBjt + ujt

Prediction
Intercept
E
K
THETA
SIGMA
H
EK
EH
KH
DEP
RD
SIZE
MTB

R2-adj.

n.s.
+
+
+
n.s.
?
+
?

Estimate
0.29
-0.87
-0.12
-2.67
0.03
0.05
0.16
-4.41
0.64
3.74
-6.50
0.06
0.14

t
3.42
-1.79
-0.93
-5.92
0.10
0.35
0.20
-4.30
2.54
7.80
-16.30
7.38
6.00

0.18
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Table 3.10
Robustness to AR(1) method of estimating reversion in profitability: statistical tests
Panel A: Conditional response of leverage to profitability
The formulas below are used to calculate the marginal responses of leverage to profitability, conditional on the speed of reversion in
profitability (K) and industry concentration (H). The conditional marginal responses are based on coefficient estimates from Table 9
and the means and standard deviations of the distributions of K and H. LEV is defined as the ratio of total long term debt to the book
value of equity, K is the speed of reversion in EBITDA estimated via first order autoregression. K low (high) is the mean of the K
distribution minus (plus) one standard deviation. H low (high) is the mean of the H distribution minus (plus) one standard deviation.
Asymptotic standard errors of the estimates in Table 9 are used to calculate t-statistics (in parentheses) for each conditional marginal
response.

Marginal response of leverage to profitability conditional on the
Speed of reversion in profitability
∂LEV
bˆ | K =
∂E

= bˆ1 + bˆ6 ( K ± σ K )
K ±σ K

Degree of industry concentration
∂LEV
bˆ | H =
∂E

= bˆ1 + bˆ7 ( H ± σ H )
H ±σ H

K low

0

H low

-0.77
(-1.86)

K high

0

H high

-2.47
(-4.96)

Panel B: Test statistics for differences in conditional coefficients
T-statistics for the indicated differences in conditional coefficients are presented in the tables below. P-values are in parentheses (onetailed test).

K low > K high

0

H high > H low

-1.87
(0.0308)
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Table 3.11
Robustness to alternative leverage definitions: regression results
Annual data are from Compustat from 1982-2000. In the following, LTD/ME is long-term debt (Compustat item 9) scaled by the
market value of common equity (25*199). LTD/TA is total long-term debt (9) divided by total assets (6). E is EBITDA, or earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (13) scaled by total assets (6). K is the speed of reversion in EBITDA, THETA
is long run mean earnings, and SIGMA is earnings volatility (estimated via the method in Sarkar and Zapatero, 2003), H is the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated annually by SIC from the universe of Compustat firms with positive sales (12), then scaled by
10,000. EK, EH, and KH are interaction terms. DEP is depreciation and amortization (125), RD is research and development expense
(46). These variables are scaled by total assets (6). SIZE is the natural log of total assets (6), and MTB is the market value of
common equity (25*199) divided by the book value of common equity (60). Asymptotic standard errors of the estimates are used to
calculate t-statistics. The prediction of “n.s.” represents not significant.

LEVjt = b0 + b1 Ejt + b2 Kjt + b3 THETAjt + b4 SIGMAjt + b5 Hjt + b6 EKt + b7 EHjt
+ b8 KHjt + b9 DEPjt + b10 RDjt + b11 SIZEjt + b12 MTBjt + ujt

Prediction
Intercept
E
K
THETA
SIGMA
H
EK
EH
KH
DEP
RD
SIZE
MTB

R2-adj.

n.s.
+
+
+
n.s.
?
+
?

Dependent Variables
LTD/ME
LTD/TA
Estimate
t
Estimate
t
0.15
1.33
0.06
9.24
-0.20
-0.54
0.19
4.74
0.10
2.63
0.01
3.15
-0.40
-2.79
0.03
1.61
-0.01
-0.63
-0.01
-4.49
1.10
2.64
0.08
4.02
0.04
1.07
-0.01
-1.31
-4.78
-4.14
-1.33
-10.33
-0.69
-2.70
0.02
1.60
1.43
2.03
1.00
17.43
-3.61
-18.52
-0.95
-24.71
0.06
6.61
0.01
18.95
-0.04
-4.77
0.00
-0.53

0.05

0.13
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Table 3.12
Robustness to alternative leverage definitions: statistical tests
Panel A: Conditional response of leverage to profitability
The formulas below are used to calculate the marginal responses of leverage to profitability, conditional on the speed of reversion in
profitability (K) and industry concentration (H). The conditional marginal responses are based on coefficient estimates from Table 11
and the means and standard deviations of the distributions of K and H. LTD/ME is long-term debt (Compustat item 9) scaled by the
market value of common equity (25*199). LTD/TA is long-term debt (9) divided by total assets (6). K is the speed of reversion in
EBITDA estimated via the method in Sarkar and Zapatero (2003). K low (high) is the mean of the K distribution minus (plus) one
half standard deviation. H low (high) is the mean of the H distribution minus (plus) one standard deviation. Asymptotic standard
errors of the estimates in Table 11 are used to calculate t-statistics (in parentheses) for each conditional marginal response.

Marginal response of leverage to profitability conditional on the
Speed of reversion in profitability
∂LEV
bˆ | K =
∂E

Degree of industry concentration
∂LEV
bˆ | H =
∂E

= bˆ1 + bˆ6 ( K ± σ K )
K ±σ K

LTD/ME

= bˆ1 + bˆ7 ( H ± σ H )
H ±σ H

LTD/TA

K low

0.10
(2.63)

H low

-0.39
(-1.22)

K low

0.19
(4.74)

H low

0.13
(3.69)

K high

0.10
(2.63)

H high

-2.20
(-9.13)

K high

0.19
(4.74)

H high

-0.37
(-10.06)

Panel B: Test statistics for differences in conditional coefficients
T-statistics for the indicated differences in conditional coefficients are presented in the tables below. P-values are in parentheses (onetailed test).

LTD/ME

LTD/TA

K low > K high

0

K low > K high

0

H high > H low

-3.20
(0.0007)

H high > H low

-6.94
( <0.0001)
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Table 3.13
Robustness to industry concentration definition: regression results for
manufacturing firms
Annual data are from Compustat from 1982-2000. In the following, LEV is long-term debt (Compustat item 9) scaled by the book
value of common equity (60). E is EBITDA, or earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (13) scaled by total
assets (6). K is the speed of reversion in EBITDA, THETA is long run mean earnings, and SIGMA is earnings volatility (estimated
via the method in Sarkar and Zapatero, 2003), H is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index from the U.S. Census Bureau for manufacturing
firms, scaled by 10,000. EK, EH, and KH are interaction terms. DEP is depreciation and amortization (125), RD is research and
development expense (46). These variables are scaled by total assets (6). SIZE is the natural log of total assets (6), MTB is the
market value of common equity (25*199) divided by the book value of common equity (60). Asymptotic standard errors of the
estimates are used to calculate t-statistics. The prediction of “n.s.” represents not significant.

LEVjt = b0 + b1 Ejt + b2 Kjt + b3 THETAjt + b4 SIGMAjt + b5 Hjt + b6 EKt + b7 EHjt
+ b8 KHjt + b9 DEPjt + b10 RDjt + b11 SIZEjt + b12 MTBjt + ujt

Prediction
Intercept
E
K
THETA
SIGMA
H
EK
EH
KH
DEP
RD
SIZE
MTB

R2-adj.

n.s.
+
+
+
n.s.
?
+
?

Estimate
0.60
-7.63
-0.28
-0.83
0.00
1.99
3.37
4.21
-1.61
4.89
-6.84
0.02
0.29

t
3.15
-3.60
-1.67
-3.89
0.16
1.88
2.68
0.62
-1.94
3.24
-4.54
0.66
2.70

0.25
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Table 3.14
Robustness to industry concentration definition: statistical tests for manufacturing
firms
Panel A: Conditional response of leverage to profitability
The formulas below are used to calculate the marginal responses of leverage to profitability, conditional on the speed of reversion in
profitability (K) and industry concentration (H). The conditional marginal responses are based on coefficient estimates from Table 13
and the means and standard deviations of the distributions of K and H. LEV is defined as the ratio of long term debt to the book value
of equity, K is the speed of reversion in EBITDA estimated via the method in Sarkar and Zapatero (2003). K low (high) is the mean
of the K distribution minus (plus) one half standard deviation. H low (high) is the mean of the H distribution minus (plus) one
standard deviation. Asymptotic standard errors of the estimates in Table 13 are used to calculate t-statistics (in parentheses) for each
conditional marginal response.

Marginal response of leverage to profitability conditional on the
Speed of reversion in profitability
∂LEV
bˆ | K =
∂E

= bˆ1 + bˆ6 ( K ± σ K )
K ±σ K

Degree of industry concentration
∂LEV
bˆ | H =
∂E

= bˆ1 + bˆ7 ( H ± σ H )
H ±σ H

K low

-5.77
(-3.70)

H low

-7.63
(-3.60)

K high

-4.25
(-3.51)

H high

-7.63
(-3.60)

Panel B: Test statistics for differences in conditional coefficients
T-statistics for the indicated differences in conditional coefficients are presented in the tables below. P-values are in parentheses (onetailed test).

K low > K high

-0.55
(0.2912)

H high > H low

0

121

